Fair, Wasabi built something good too, and certainly succeeded in user adoption in a way JoinMarket never did (sadly, though for many reasons), but if we jump to a theoretical world where they both have an equal user base, I know which one I’m picking.

14 individual Input UTXO’s

18 Output UTXO’s (9 are identical values)

Testing full privacy mode in #amethyst

Can anyone confirm they see this? #asknostr

Which conjoin software do you recommend?

You could also compare apples to oranges but you would still look like a fool.

Says the guy publishing podcasts about an inactive CoinJoin implementation 🙃

If you could then you would have but you can't because you're out of your depth. None of your examples are the result of address re-use in the CoinJoin. Unlike Wasabi's systemic & symmetric address re-use vulnerabilities which both occur in the CoinJoin transaction.

To clarify further: in your first example above, the coordinator fee is provided during the tx0 transaction while the wallet is setting up for and prior to the CoinJoin transaction. Tx0 transactions have obvious on-chain fingerprints and I fail to see how identifying the address used by the coordinator to collect the fee has any bearing on the anonymity of the user.

In your second example, the re-used address was also re-used in a Wasabi CoinJoin tx so that doesn't help your case but more importantly, when it was re-used by Samourai, it was in the tx0 - not the CoinJoin transaction. Additionally, based on the comments in that thread, the wallet was imported to Samourai and admittedly wasn't fully synced.

Finally in your third example and like the others, this was not a case of address re-use in the CoinJoin transaction (unlike Wasabi) but rather limited occurrences of address re-use in post-mix spending tools like Stowaway, Stonewall, & Stonewallx2. As explained in Samourai Wallet's write up of their investigation into the reported issue: not nearly as many addresses were effected as originally claimed and for good measure Samourai Wallet introduced Strict Mode after this report to mitigate unintentional address re-use by the users when transacting with post-mix spending tools.

Despite your efforts to equate Wasabi's address re-use vulnerabilities to Samourai Wallet, you have come up short yet again.

As I mentioned, there is a non-zero chance Wasabi's systemic address re-use vulnerability will send a mixed output to a previously used change address, that's one reason choosing Wasabi would have been a poor choice. Another is that there is also a non-zero chance that Wasabi's symmetric address reuse vulnerability will include the same address on both the input & output sides of the mix. Additionally, fees paid to Wasabi helped support chain analysis companies; utxos are ground to dust if left to CoinJoin for too long; and now that ZKsnacks' coordinator liquidity has been broken up among several new coordinators, users can enjoy dancing with themselves in shallow liquidity pools that offer no practical anonymity benefits.

Further more, the existence of doxxic change makes no difference when a user is intentionally sending all their outputs to their pre-mix wallet (of all places) and then consolidating them. To even achieve what you've demonstrated the user would have to put in considerable effort to make such a mess of things.

Your example is one of intentionally destructive user behavior and this entire exercise has demonstrated that you are purposefully attempting to misguide people and/or you have little to no grasp on the subject. Despite your inability to identify that example as a blatantly obvious and intentional maneuver to consolidate outputs, you chose to confidently use it as an example to equate the vulnerabilities in one wallet with the deliberate choices made by the user in another wallet. The fact that you have been engaging in tactics such as this for years is disturbing and the fact that you continue to do so after the Samourai Wallet coordinator has been shut down is deranged.

how do I

as a user,

calculate the entropy gained by a wasabi CJ?

because if a tool doesn't have reproducible behavior

how can I put trust into it?

False equivalence, asinine assessment. The user could have just spent from their post-mix wallet but instead re-used addresses from their pre-mix wallet and consolidated. The user had to deliberately choose to do this by fetching pre-mix wallet addresses and manually paste them to the post-mix wallet.

Comparing intentional and deliberately retarded user behavior to Wasabi which has symmetric address re-use (same address on the input & output sides of the mix) as well as systemic address re-use (mix outputs sent to previously used change addresses) without any unexpected user behavior triggering the failure demonstrates your continued efforts to misguide and confuse people. You're deplorable and I encourage you to do the world a favor and delete your podcast.

dont request from relays, publish to relays, or pull media for pfp, banner, images etc until user specifies whether they want tor or clearnet on the initial opening of client if never set.

existing users can default as it is today

Rollups really are one of the dumbest layered proposals in this whole space.

😂😂😂😂 wasabi fixes onchain privacy. Good one pal.

You absolutely do not!

ok i wanna know: what’s missing in your bitcoin life??

Samourai but decentralized. Not sure how we get privacy on the base layer at this point