#pocketbitcoin now supports ethereum. Just click on the set up button aaaaaaand.... 😉
Where did you take this? River's report (link below) at page 21 shows a slightly different image (e.g. Blixt in the "custodial wallets" section)
https://river.com/learn/files/river-lightning-report-2023.pdf
I'd love to see this but with subtitles talking about the rebranding of Twitter
https://acinq.co/blog/phoenix-splicing-update
😳 What the Ph....oenix!
Then please someone build a similar thing for WhatsApp and Twitter and Threads and every app you can imagine and get the whole world banned and leave apple with an empty AppStore with just their Messages and FaceTime apps on it 😂
What about releasing an IPA version of the app (maybe on GitHub) with zaps enabled? It can be installed without using the AppStore, why not?
Thank you for highlighting this. We're going to document for formal development follow-up. https://github.com/SeedSigner/seedsigner/issues/390
Thank you
Yeah, it's a remote possibility. But it's good to be aware it is possible.
An immediate, although not convenient solution, consists in using the 'vcgencmd otp_dump' command to print and check the OTP registers have not been modified. However it's only a partial solution because the command doesn't show the first 256 bits. I need to further investigate how to print the first 8 32-bits registers.
Oh, that's really interesting!
It's a one-time write register so if we explicitly wrote garbage, all zeroes, etc, that would preclude it being used for nefarious purposes later.
What I found more intriguing is the possibility to write an RSA public key -- like, say, the nostr:npub17tyke9lkgxd98ruyeul6wt3pj3s9uxzgp9hxu5tsenjmweue6sqq4y3mgl public key. Not sure yet what that might enable... still can't trust anything running from the SD card...
Not sure all 32-bit registers (they are 67) are one-time write. Modifying some of them could compromise the correct behaviour of the device, for example the 17th changes the boot mode (microSD/USB), but for sure a lot of them could be used to store keys and can be zeroed out without bricking the device.
There are some tools that allow writing a private key to the inbuilt One-Time Programmable memory of the Raspberry Pi. Is there a way to break or disable the OTP memory permanently in order to rule out the (even remote) possibility of a private key being written there when using a SeedSigner?
#[0] #[1] #[2] #[3]
More info below...
OTP memory:
rpi-otp-private-key tool:
https://github.com/raspberrypi/usbboot/tree/master
rpi-derive-key tool:
https://lib.rs/crates/rpi-derive-key
No more ⚡️ icon on the note, just direct tips the user account https://nostr.build/av/bb4635435c011ac914a54fb37db0532599aaa7920146c59dbf4117c921603be6.mov
There are some tools that allow writing a private key to the inbuilt One-Time Programmable memory of the Raspberry Pi. Is there a way to break or disable the OTP memory in order to rule out the (even remote) possibility of a private key being written there when using a SeedSigner?
#[1]
More info below...
OTP memory:
rpi-otp-private-key tool:
https://github.com/raspberrypi/usbboot/tree/master
rpi-derive-key tool:
#[2]#[3]
#[4]
"Too ignorant of technology" is not the point, the point is the biased and common human habit of passively accepting only one truth that is transmitted top-down by something or someone who is diffusely idealised and trusted. Instead of making the effort to think about a topic and make an independent decision. The ultimate outcome of this behaviour is centralisation. This applies to everything, not only the #Bitcoin consensus.