you can join incognito, with random name, or use different profile, but not different picture in the same profile.

Livestream on X: February 11, 5pm UTC, 9am PT.

SimpleX network: Power to the People!

Evgeny and Dan Keller (co-founder of Flux) will talk about:

- extreme decentralisation,

- Flux servers in the apps,

- future commercial model,

- large content channels,

- moderation & freedom of speech.

Join us at https://x.com/SimpleXChat

Opt Out podcast: Improving SimpleX Chat w/ Evgeny from SimpleX and Dan Keller from Flux

https://optoutpod.com/episodes/improving-simplex/

Privacy-preserving content moderation - preventing abuse of SimpleX network without any compromise to users' privacy and end-to-end encryption.

https://simplex.chat/blog/20250114-simplex-network-large-groups-privacy-preserving-content-moderation.html

This is our response to #ChatControl ideas - no need to scan content to moderate it.

Post your comments!

How would it work? SimpleX client would connect to Wallet Connect?

SimpleX Chat v6.2 is out!

The app now includes both servers that we operate and servers independently operated by Flux – thanks to Daniel Keller and Flux team!

More privacy and decentralization for all users!

Also in v6.2:

- business chats!

- better UX: open chat on first unread (not on iOS yet), show who reacted.

- bette iOS notifications!

Read more: https://simplex.chat/blog/20241210-simplex-network-v6-2-servers-by-flux-business-chats.html

Servers operated by Flux added to SimpleX Chat apps (v6.2-beta.1) to improve metadata privacy – a game changer for SimpleX network users!

https://simplex.chat/blog/20241125-servers-operated-by-flux-true-privacy-and-decentralization-for-all-users.html

Huge thanks to Daniel Keller (Flux CEO and co-founder) for supporting our vision for extreme decentralization of communications!

If nobody was paying attention, it would not have been a problem. But many people, beyond the niche of technologists and privacy supporters, are misled to see privacy as something that enables rather than reduces crime, and it may have very damaging consequences for democracy – it's a real threat. So this response is necessary.

Our criticism of recently published

Wired article: "Wired's Attack on Privacy"

https://simplex.chat/blog/20241016-wired-attack-on-privacy.html

New security review by Trail of Bits and new v6.1 released – better calls, better iOS notifications and better user experience!

https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html

v6.1-beta.0 is released with support for SOCKS proxies both in iOS (via TestFlight) and Android (via Github releases as direct APK download: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases/tag/v6.1.0-beta.0).

You can host your own SOCKS proxy (this one looks good: https://github.com/heiher/hev-socks5-server) or you can try ours, if you use preset servers (it won't allow connecting to any other servers directly, but you can still send messages to anybody who uses other servers):

Address: 139.162.173.97

Port: 443

Username: user

Password: YJHolWSzTfOny7es

It is not the same. Build reproducibility means that every time you build the app from the source code you would get exactly the same result, identical byte by byte. It would allow independent parties to validate that the apps that we distribute via different channels are built from the source code we publish.

The problem is that to achieve this quality requires that the build process is deterministic, and in general case it is not:

- some libraries may embed timestamps during compilation.

- compilers my use random numbers for some identifiers.

- etc.

We plan to solve this problem, but it is much harder than it may seem.

Answering your questions about "private message routing" in SimpleX network:

1. Does SimpleX protect IP addresses? Yes.

2. Doesn't private message routing reinvent Tor? No.

3. Why don't you embed Tor? Tor is great, but not for all.

Read more in FAQ: https://simplex.chat/faq/#does-simplex-protect-my-ip-address

Thanks to our users who highlighted these inaccuracies to us!

6. Is the design well documented? Somewhat

The design documentation was reviewed in preparation for design security audit in July 2024 - report is about to be published.

5. Does the company log timestamps/IP addresses? Yes

This is incorrect, we never logged IP addresses and access timestamps of the users.

Further, the private message routing that is now enabled by default for all users prevents such logging by any 3rd party servers with modified code:

https://simplex.chat/blog/20240604-simplex-chat-v5.8-private-message-routing-chat-themes.html

4. Directory service could be modified to enable a MITM attack? Yes

This is incorrect, as there is no user directory service at all (and no knowledge of even the number of users), and MITM by servers is not possible by design, even without optional security code verification (that exists to mitigate MITM by the channel you used to pass one-time invitation link, e.g. email).

3. Cryptographic primitives. Curve25519 / XSalsa20 256 / Poly1305 (downgraded for the absence of PQ encryption).

We added PQ encryption in March this year: https://simplex.chat/blog/20240314-simplex-chat-v5-6-quantum-resistance-signal-double-ratchet-algorithm.html

This is done in the same way as Apple describes as PQ3 here: https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/

it provides stronger protection than Signal design where PQ encryption only applies to the initial key exchange.

2. Company jurisdiction: UK

We disagree that there are any jurisdictions that are particularly good for privacy.

Also, this might important for centralised services, like Threema, where the users can't host servers, and much less important for decentralized network, such as SimpleX, where there are hundreds (if not thousands) of servers that we don't control.