I have to agree on this one. ed25519 is suspicious by association.
just sayin, they also left out the koblitz version of P256, which is our known and loved secp256k1
the propaganda campaign against the koblitz curve was incredible, yet somehow they have given ed25519 a pass... which smells pretty fishy to me, almost like, they KNOW that the koblitz curve is even more secure than the edwards twisted curve
the only solution, as i see it, is a noise protocol implementation that uses sha256 and secp256k1 for HMAC, and i started on building one for #golang
i already spotted this egregiously obvious manipulation in the "academic" scene years ago, and i'm pretty sure that nostr:npub180cvv07tjdrrgpa0j7j7tmnyl2yr6yr7l8j4s3evf6u64th6gkwsyjh6w6 picked bip-340 secp256k1 X-only schnorr signatures for #nostr
you know why i don't trust edwards?
because all the shitcoins used it
because your precious fucking rust favorizes it
funny how still there is no viable shortcut to bruteforcing bitcoin's koblitz curve group now isn't it?
nice to see that you are thinking about this though, welcome to the NIST cryptography skeptics club
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