We don't have this feature as a priority because it would be detectable with forensic analysis. People would just trust the feature too much thinking its existence would be hidden when it would only trick a bystander. GrapheneOS is well known, they'd just treat any device installed as likely to have a hidden profile.

We suggest keeping things in a separate profile and deleting it when things get heated. No data is worth keeping if you're being targeted over it. If you were someone like a whistleblower you'd ideally provide copies to others or make encrypted backups to a trusted cloud they aren't aware of should the device be taken.

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Okay, makes sense. Thanks

Yes, I am aware Cellebrite specifically publishes their ability to (or lack theorof really) to access GrapheneOS devices, which is a bit of a unique honour.

A different set of security practices is required for sophisticated adverseries. For instance a duress pin that immediately restarts the device and disables the USB port or resets the secure element.

I had this more in mind as a defense against unsophisticated physical threat actors, the proverbial $5 wrench attacks, thugs, unsophisticated or informal law enforcement etc.

GrapheneOS has a duress password that erases the phone instantly and wipes secure element when triggered, the USB controls feature can disable data lines or the port entirely in hardware when booted to the OS and can be configured separately to it.