Wabisabi

I have been reviewing wabisabi in depth this last week and it is really disruptive, I honestly haven't tried wasabi version 2 until now.

I'm a person who reasons, who sees the nuances, so I'm not going to get into the dichotomy is bad because they use chain analysis to censor inbound transactions (I don't know any case of being censored) because we are talking only and exclusively from the technical point of view.

It's amazing how Wabisabi solves the problem of toxic change, it's amazing the automatic consolidations it performs while remixing, and if someone has a statistical method to unanonymize these transactions let him show it or shut up.

Below 0.01 btc no coordinator fee is paid, try it yourself.

It's the cheapest thing to do if you want to clean up your coin trail in small amounts.

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Discussion

Very much appreciate that you're taking the time to look deeper into the tech.

I very much agree with your take, the arbitrary amount coinjoin coordination protocol opens up an entirely new design space of anonymous bitcoin transactions.

We've been doing a pretty bad job of that in the past, and Wasabi 2.0 is our first attempt to make a substantial improvement, yet still, it can get even so much better!

As far as I have been able to see, the decomposition of the input tx into the set fractions is random, it does not have to go from largest to smallest, or smallest to largest.

I also love the recombination it does in later mixes of utxo already mixed with new utxo.

Starting from different utxo and separated in time, I find it very difficult if not impossible to even associate later consolidations.

I do not know very well how to describe it, I would say that all this procedure adds a lot of entropy to the system, your utxo do not remain static, they can change when a new unmixed utxo enters and a later mix is performed even without you selecting those utxo already mixed with the previous version of Wasabi.

Honestly it is an incredible job.

Correct.

The number of inputs your client registers is random, with a bias depending on the size of your existing utxo set.

The group of inputs your client registers is random, depending on the anonscore calculated for each utxo and the value of the utxo.

The number of outputs your client registers is random, depending on how many possible decomposition there are.

The value of outputs your client registers is random, depending on the value of other users input, and the sum value of all your inputs.

There are a lot of different possible input and output groups, we remove those that are very expensive, and pick randomly from the rest.

Here is a bit more thorough explanation from a year ago, there have been numerous changes and improvements since though.

https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-April/020202.html

Good to know, I’ve never used wasabi or wabisabi but I think it’s important to have competition in creating the best coinjoin. I’m not technical enough to analyze the inner working of a coinjoin so Ali appreciate the effort of others on this front

The coinjoin rabbit hole goes really deep, I'm still learning new technical nuances constantly.

To get a rough intuition of the privacy properties, I think it's best to look at a WabiSabi coinjoin and ask yourself these three questions:

Which inputs belong to the same user?

Which outputs belong to the same user?

How many users are there?

https://mempool.space/tx/c235c866e68aeb1ccd51af06157ba068c1fa7a30a90d1591b24f422682cc3aef

All of the drama lately has convinced me to give it a spin. I’m ashamed to admit I let the furor over input censorship push me away. Let the best technology win!

Fun challenge:

After you've made a couple coinjoins, look at the address you first sent bitcoin to, and try to follow where it went on a block explorer...