21M is enforced through the UTXO set. everything _outside_ of direct cryptographic ownership of UTXOs is designed to be regulated by this mechanism. whether it's an ETF, Liquid, a rollup, a fedimint, coin-pools or just vanilla LN - it's all regulated by the OPTIONALITY to demand and provide on-chain settlement

this means that the "thundering-herd" apocalypse scenario is not just a risk of technical layers like LN, Covenants, but a structurally unsolvable limit of bitcoin. by design

if so, why not go with the constructs that can at least guarantee the highest amount of successful unilateral enforcement: Covenants?

if the alternatives are banks, ETFs and/or federations, i rather at least knowing i have _some_ chance of ejecting a non-cooperating counter-party than having none at all

that quality is also the only kind of game-theoretic dynamic that can be stable on the highest resolution of end-users