On Providing Value

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How can we tell if transactions "provide value"?

The assumption from an Austrian economics standpoint is that any voluntary transaction is value-providing because each party believes the trade will satisfy some subjective need or want. So for example, OnlyFans is a value-providing transaction because both parties do what they do willingly and do so in the belief that they will get value.

Yet practically speaking, there's something weird about this. There are lots of voluntary transactions that don't provide value, perhaps significantly subtract value. Gambling, for example or other addictions (drugs, porn, etc) where one party is making a lot of money from the addicted person does not seem value-adding at all. How do we account for this? Is there some hidden fraud in these transactions? Or can we add some other principle by which we can tell if a transaction is value-providing?

The first thing to notice about these transactions is that they have high time preference behavior around them. There's at least one party that's being especially impulsive. A lot of mobile games, for example, rely on addictive, impulsive behavior to make money and they have more of the sucker-swindler relationship. The dynamic shares much more with rent-seeking or fraud than, say, someone paying for an Uber ride.

Yet the libertarian norm is considering anything voluntary to be value-adding. But is trading of fentanyl by an addict and dealer really a value-providing transaction? Common sense says no, yet subjectively, both parties wanted to do the transaction, so what's the problem? Is subjective evaluation of the benefits of trade enough to determine whether it's value-adding?

This is not an idle question. The British got a lot of resources from China by getting them addicted to opium. That would seem at some level nasty and unfair, that people were in some way tricked.

In other words, there has to be some expansion of the definition of fraud to align our definition of providing value to practical experience. Does selling drugs to an addict provide value? Subjective value says if it's done voluntarily it is. Can fraud be defined precisely enough that we can align our intuition that such trades don't provide value? This is the gap through which much evil is justified. We seek here to close that gap.

What's the character of these problematic trades? First, the person buying doesn't have self-control. There's little personal responsibility and the trade is made under some personal distress. Clearly, such buyers don't have low enough time preference and we could leave it at that, but it's unsatisfactory because these people are hurting themselves. Many such actions like that are clearly detrimental and value-subtracting. Suicide is clearly detrimental, for example, and is essentially a transaction with yourself.

And this is where we get a little more intuition about what's value-adding. The obviously bad transactions are done by people committing violence to themselves.

Please don't misunderstand where I'm going with this. I'm not using some concept of violence against ourselves as the justification for government tyranny, by saying that they are protecting you from yourself. I'm only saying that we should acknowledge that some people do commit violence to themselves and that this is not a good thing or a value-adding thing.

Should we be preventing people from committing violence to themselves? That's a much harder question, because doing so may infringe on their human rights. But you can condemn the people selling this stuff as if it's something good. They are committing fraud in how they present their goods and/or services.

Indeed, that's what's been happening. The people with the profit motive are getting angry, because they don't like other people interfering with their sales with moral condemnation which is really bad publicity. But this is the normal consequence of bad behavior. You get condemnation by third parties. That doesn't mean third parties should now suddenly be trusted, but we need more information in the market, not less.

Now, some behavior that is condemned by one group may not be considered bad by another. This is where we get some subjectiveness to morality. And this is where we also get a lot of righteous indignation. But there is another dimension, particularly of violence to yourself that need explaining. Not everything voluntary provides value.

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Discussion

I think "Provides Value" needs to be better defined. If I was miserable and decided to kill myself then I would argue that I have provided value to myself. The way you are using the term makes it sound like transactions should "provide value" to society or some greater goal of human progress. I agree with condemnation of swindlers, but if addicts want more drugs I do see that tx as a value add for both parties involved.

I think transactions between weak men will always look less valuable to men of stronger character. But such is life

very interesting thought experiment Jimmy 🙏

So is it that those with more robust moral and ethical frameworks focus on value that’s defined/valued by lower time preferences .. and conversely that focusing on delivering value for high time preference folks is from those without, or lesser frameworks?

Street vendors selling hot food? Hmmm, well that doesn’t stack up either

The self destructive component is the key aspect probably .. but even there, that observation of “self destructive” or in your phrasing “violence against one’s self” is actually subjective

Got me thinking though 🤝

Austrian economics does not assume that voluntary transactions are value-providing from the standpoint of some observer not involved in the exchange. It only asserts that the parties involved showed through their revealed preference that they considered the trade to be value-providing to themselves, and only in the ex ante sense. They may later regret the exchange for any reason, including the legitimate moral reasons you refer to. Also, Austrian economics does not assume that people's values are all constructive or moral, only that they have these values and have a rank order of these as a basis for action.

From a libertarian perspective, distinct but compatible to the Austrian one, there is no assertion of any voluntary trade being value-providing either. It only asserts that others do not have the right to coerce those making non-value providing choices, so long as others' property rights are not infringed on.