This WabiSabi coinjoin has 5 inputs for 0.05000000 and 8 outputs for 0.05000000 - mempool.space/tx/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b

Since it provides even greater privacy than any 1:1 Whirlpool coinjoin can, what do you call that? 160% entropy?

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Discussion

What is your take on address reuse on this protocol? It’s provable right? You probably consider it as fud. I’m genuinely interested in your take

Reusing addresses is bad for privacy, there's no denying that at all.

But at the end of the day, Bitcoin is non custodial: Your keys, your coins. If you choose to send to an already used address, the coordinator can't do anything to stop you in a meaningful way.

Don’t blame the user! I am talking about symmetric address reuse (same address used on both sides of the transaction)

Would it be fair to blame the user if they imported the seed into a second client running simultaneously? This would cause address collisions since each client is not aware of transactions the other is signing.

That’s what I meant with „genuinely interested“. I condemn the cooperation of wasabi with chain anal. But I have a feeling the the adress reuse thing is an extreme provoked edge case. Hinting a weak coinjoin protocol but not really relevant in a practical use scenario

I'm genuinely interested in what extreme edge cases would cause a client to reuse an address as well. Here's an example of address reuse regarding Samourai's client - https://twitter.com/brian_trollz/status/1283525347007442944

https://twitter.com/brian_trollz/status/1445065052118261776

But since address reuse is not a part of either coinjoin protocol itself, it's not really relevant to the solving the problem of "What is the best way to make non private inputs into private outputs without revealing any addresses belong to each other".