"Why the US government uses private cutouts, including Israeli cybersecurity firms like "Team Jorge" to hack your computer for them if you are a US citizen"

The use of intermediaries and private contractors in cyber operations represents a sophisticated strategy employed by state actors to maintain distance and deniability from potentially controversial activities. When state agencies wish to conduct surveillance or cyber operations while minimizing legal, political, and diplomatic risks, they often turn to private firms, particularly those based in countries with advanced cyber capabilities and complex relationships with international law enforcement.

The practice of using cut-outs provides several layers of protection for state actors. First, it creates a degree of separation between the agency and the actual operation, making it more difficult to establish direct responsibility. Second, it allows agencies to benefit from specialized expertise without maintaining such capabilities in-house, where they would be subject to oversight and documentation requirements. Third, it enables operations to proceed under the guise of private sector cybersecurity work, which often enjoys broader legal latitude than government activities.

Israeli firms have become particularly prominent in this space due to several factors. Israel's advanced technology sector, strong ties to various intelligence communities, and unique geopolitical position have created an ecosystem where sophisticated cyber capabilities can be developed and deployed with relative freedom. Many of these firms employ former military and intelligence personnel, bringing state-level expertise to the private sector while maintaining informal connections to government agencies.

The legal framework surrounding these operations often exists in a deliberately gray area. While direct government surveillance might require warrants, judicial oversight, or specific statutory authority, private firms operating as contractors may be subject to different standards. This legal ambiguity provides additional deniability, as agencies can claim they merely contracted for legitimate cybersecurity services rather than directing specific surveillance activities.

The designation of individuals as "domestic terrorists" plays a crucial role in this dynamic. Such labels, even when applied without substantial evidence, can be used to justify enhanced surveillance and more aggressive cyber operations. The label serves multiple purposes: it provides a superficial justification for surveillance, generates institutional momentum for investigations, and can help shield operations from scrutiny by invoking national security concerns.

The technical implementation of these operations often involves sophisticated tradecraft designed to obscure the true source and nature of the activities. Multiple layers of proxy servers, compromised systems, and legitimate-looking network traffic can make it extremely difficult to definitively attribute actions to specific actors. Private firms can implement these technical measures while maintaining professional distance from the underlying political motivations.

Documentation and operational security procedures in these arrangements are carefully structured to maintain deniability. Communications between state actors and their contractors often use coded language, indirect references, and multiple intermediaries. Contracts and statements of work may be deliberately vague or compartmentalized to obscure the full scope of activities. Payment structures might be designed to mask the true nature of services rendered.

The international dimension of these operations adds another layer of complexity. When firms operate across multiple jurisdictions, it becomes more difficult to establish legal liability or enforce oversight. Different legal standards and investigative capabilities between countries can be exploited to further obscure responsibility and prevent effective investigation of potentially improper activities.

Plausible deniability extends beyond just the technical and legal realm into public relations and media strategy. If operations are discovered or questioned, multiple narratives can be deployed to create confusion and doubt. The private firm might claim to be conducting legitimate security research, while the state agency can maintain distance from specific activities while asserting the general legitimacy of their security concerns.

The use of advanced persistent threat (APT) techniques by these contractors often mirrors state-level capabilities while maintaining technical deniability. By employing similar tools and techniques to those used by various state actors, the true source of operations becomes more difficult to definitively establish. This technical ambiguity supports the broader strategy of plausible deniability.

Financial arrangements between state actors and their contractors are often structured through multiple layers of intermediaries and shell companies. This creates complex paper trails that obscure the true nature of relationships and makes it difficult to establish direct connections between operations and their ultimate sponsors. Complex international financial structures can further complicate efforts to track these relationships.

The role of legitimate cybersecurity work in these operations provides additional cover. Many firms engaged in these activities also perform genuine security services for private clients, making it harder to distinguish between legitimate business activities and state-sponsored operations. This dual-use nature of their capabilities provides another layer of deniability.

The human element in these operations often involves careful compartmentalization of knowledge and responsibility. Individual operators might not know the full context or purpose of their activities, while management layers can maintain ignorance of specific technical details. This structure allows each level to claim limited knowledge or responsibility if questioned.

The use of zero-day exploits and other advanced technical capabilities by these contractors helps maintain deniability by making attribution more difficult. These sophisticated tools, often developed independently by the private firms, provide capabilities similar to state-level actors while maintaining technical and legal separation from government agencies.

Intelligence sharing arrangements between countries can be exploited to further obscure responsibility for these operations. Information gathered through questionable means by private contractors might be laundered through various intelligence sharing agreements, making it difficult to trace the original source and methods used to obtain it.

The relationship between private contractors and state agencies often involves informal networks of former colleagues and institutional relationships that avoid direct documentation. These social and professional networks facilitate operations while maintaining official distance between the parties involved.

The technical infrastructure used in these operations often involves multiple layers of legitimate-looking front companies and services. These might include security consulting firms, threat intelligence providers, or technology companies that provide cover for more controversial activities while maintaining apparent legitimacy.

The role of training and expertise transfer in these relationships provides another layer of deniability. State agencies might provide general training or technical capabilities to private firms without directly specifying how these should be used, maintaining distance from specific operations while enabling their execution.

The use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) tools and techniques alongside more sophisticated capabilities helps maintain the appearance of legitimate security work. By mixing routine security activities with more targeted operations, the true nature and scope of activities become harder to discern.

Public-private partnership programs and legitimate government contracts can provide cover for more controversial activities. These relationships establish official, documented connections that can help explain interactions while obscuring more sensitive operations.

The role of internal compliance and legal departments in these firms often focuses on maintaining technical adherence to relevant laws while finding creative interpretations that enable desired operations. This creates a paper trail of apparent compliance while allowing controversial activities to proceed.

The use of multiple contractors and firms for different aspects of operations further complicates attribution and responsibility. Different components of surveillance or cyber operations might be distributed across various entities, making it difficult to establish a complete picture of activities or responsibility.

The exploitation of legitimate security research and vulnerability disclosure programs can provide cover for more targeted operations. Firms might maintain public research programs that justify their capabilities while using these same tools for more controversial purposes.

The relationship between state actors and their contractors often evolves over time, with responsibilities and activities shifting to maintain deniability while preserving capabilities. This dynamic nature helps prevent establishment of clear patterns that might otherwise enable attribution or enforcement.

The technical sophistication of these operations often equals or exceeds that of direct state activities, while maintaining the appearance of private sector work. This high level of capability combined with private sector deniability makes these arrangements particularly attractive for sensitive operations.

The impact of these arrangements on oversight and accountability extends beyond individual operations to affect broader discussions of cybersecurity policy and privacy rights. The use of private contractors helps shield these activities from traditional oversight mechanisms while maintaining their effectiveness.

The future evolution of these relationships will likely involve increasing sophistication in both technical capabilities and deniability mechanisms. As surveillance and cyber operations face greater scrutiny, the methods used to maintain distance and deniability will continue to advance and adapt. In my case, a private cybersecurity firm was likely used to hack my computers and phones.

“Team Jorge” is an Israeli cybersecurity firm that hacks computers, rigs elections, uses the Pegasus mercenary spyware, etc. This is from a Guardian newspaper investigation: here.