Also because Russia is much more populated than Germany. Inferior metallurgy was another factor. The tank factories in KTZ in modern day Ukraine was the turning point. Had the NAZIS overran those factories they would have marched to Moscow. The Soviets just had more shitty tanks.
Discussion
The reason cited by soviet officers for not supplying rifles to soldiers was that they feared soldiers would use them on their own officers. But there was also the economic component, of course.
Claim Set Under Review:
Population advantage, inferior metallurgy, decisive tank factories in Ukraine, inevitability of Moscow’s fall, and “more but worse tanks.”
Verdict: Mixed. Contains partial truths, exaggerations, and factual errors.
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1. Population: Soviet Union vs Germany
Assessment: Partly true, overstated in implication
• Soviet Union population in 1939: ~170–194 million (depending on borders used).
• Germany population in 1939 (incl. Austria, Sudetenland): ~79–90 million.
Conclusion:
The Soviet Union had roughly 2× the population, not an overwhelming demographic margin by itself. Population mattered, but it did not guarantee victory and did not offset catastrophic early losses automatically.
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2. “Inferior metallurgy” as a major cause
Assessment: Largely false / misleading
• Soviet metallurgy was uneven, not broadly inferior.
• Early-war issues included:
• Poor quality control.
• Inconsistent heat treatment.
• Brittle armor in some 1941–42 batches.
• By 1942–43, Soviet steel production and alloying stabilized and improved, often trading hardness for ductility to avoid shattering.
Critical counterpoint:
German metallurgy declined later in the war due to alloy shortages (nickel, molybdenum, tungsten). Late-war German armor quality often deteriorated more severely than Soviet armor.
Conclusion:
Metallurgy was not a decisive Soviet weakness and became a relative German liability after 1943.
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3. “Tank factories in KTZ in modern-day Ukraine were the turning point”
Assessment: Incorrect entity and incorrect causal framing
• The key Ukrainian facility was Kharkiv Tractor Plant (KhTZ), not “KTZ.”
• KhTZ produced early T-34s.
• Crucial fact:
The Soviets evacuated Kharkiv’s industry eastward (Urals, Siberia) in 1941 before permanent German capture.
Actual turning point:
• The evacuation program itself.
• Reconstitution of tank production at Nizhny Tagil, Chelyabinsk (“Tankograd”), and other eastern complexes.
Conclusion:
Ukraine-based factories were important early, but their survival was not the turning point. Their loss was anticipated and mitigated.
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4. “Had the Nazis overrun those factories, they would have marched to Moscow”
Assessment: False / counterfactual oversimplification
• Nazi Germany already captured Kharkiv multiple times.
• Moscow was threatened in late 1941 before industrial recovery mattered.
• German failure at Moscow was driven by:
• Logistical collapse.
• Overextension.
• Weather.
• Red Army strategic reserves.
• German manpower and fuel constraints.
Conclusion:
Control of Kharkiv factories was not a determinant of Moscow’s fate. The claim confuses industrial capacity with operational reach.
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5. “The Soviets just had more shitty tanks”
Assessment: Partly true, rhetorically exaggerated
Accurate elements:
• The Red Army fielded:
• Large numbers of obsolete models (T-26, BT-series).
• Poor radios.
• Weak optics.
• Inadequate crew training in 1941.
Incorrect generalization:
• The T-34 and KV-1 were not inferior.
• Superior armor layout.
• Effective main guns.
• Mechanically crude but combat-effective.
• Soviet doctrine emphasized:
• Simplicity.
• Mass production.
• Field repairability.
Comparative reality:
• Germans had fewer, more complex tanks.
• Soviets accepted higher loss rates to achieve strategic depth and replacement speed.
Conclusion:
The Red Army had many bad tanks early, but also some of the most influential tank designs of the war. “Shitty tanks” is an imprecise summary.
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Overall Conclusion
• Population advantage: real but not decisive alone.
• Inferior metallurgy: largely incorrect.
• Ukrainian tank factories as turning point: false framing.
• Inevitability of Moscow’s fall: false.
• “More but worse tanks”: partially true early; false as a general rule.
The Soviet victory was driven by industrial evacuation, operational adaptation, strategic depth, and attritional capacity, not crude numerical or material inferiority narratives.