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In Count Two, the DOJ originally alleged that Samourai conspired to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B) and (C). The DOJ recently withdrew subsection (B) in a superseding indictment, leaving only subsection (C) remaining.

Thus, liability for Count Two now hinges on whether Samourai was a (1) "money transmitting business" that (2) "involve[d] the transportation or transmission of funds" (3) that Samourai knew came from or were intended for an unlawful purpose.

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Discussion

Mallard Beakman 6mo ago

An adverse ruling for Samourai on subsection (C) would have a narrower impact than a previously feared ruling on subsection (B) would have had. Proving actual knowledge or intent is an additional burden the State must satisfy to reach a conviction. Unfortunately for Samourai, the DOJ will likely use the Defendants' social media posts against them to show knowledge and intent.

If Samourai's non-custodial CoinJoin coordinator business can violate § 1960(b)(1)(C), bitcoin miners or LSPs could be similarly liable if their businesses "involve[] the transportation or transmission of funds" that they know come from or go toward an unlawful activity.

Mallard Beakman 6mo ago

Count 1, by the way, is conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), which also has a knowledge requirement.

With Count 2 limited to § 1960(b)(1)(C), the two counts now more closely mirror each other.