Banning inputs from registering is pretty much the same thing economically as a fidelity bond. In both cases BTC is tied up and unable to be used for the intended purpose.

A true time locked fidelity bond could potentially be a stronger defense as the funds couldn't be used for anything else during the timelock. But that's pretty disruptive to users of Wasabi. So there's trade-offs to implementing stronger protections.

Re: confiscation, I don't think there is any way to do that with pure on-chain scripts even in theory, ignoring current scripting limitations. The problem is how do you prove to a third party – script validators – that an entity failed to make a network call in time? With trust you could do that, eg with a multisig. But I doubt that Wasabi wants to have that kind of control over peoples' coins.

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Well, with a fidelity bond the money is truly unspendable for a time. Whereas a coordinator banning is only the denial of that particular service, yet another coordinator may accept the input, and of course a single user transaction can always be done.

Fair. I should have used less strong language there.