What I took away from the spaces and my own research is that:

- Wasabi has conflicts of interest by promoting a coordinator that directly funds Chain Analytics. They say it doesn’t matter because user can pick the coordinator but this is a false choice when liquidity determines the privacy “guarantees” (see below) of the mixing. Other coordinators have less liquidity, you’re hiding in a smaller pond.

- WabiSabi and Wasabi seem to use a fuzzy “anonymity score” system where the user sets this number in the client and their bitcoin mixes until it reaches the threshold. Problem is this number is poorly defined and it’s unclear what threshold you need to achieve privacy, there is no guarantee, it’s all fuzzy and depends on how the rounds turn out (see below)

- WabiSabi mixing is good at aggregating (and decomposing and recomposing amounts of) transactions on the *input* side but outputs still rely on this fuzzy logic anonymity score to “know” if your utxo is private enough. Outputs are not all the same amount like Whirlpool, so you’re only not guaranteed anon sets with known numbers of identical value utxos to hide among, instead outputs have variable amounts which can lead to low anon sets. The client would then remix again they say until privacy is achieved… this threshold is again poorly defined and makes assumptions about what chain analytics are able to probabilistically compute or not, a big question I have is how future proof are these probabilistic privacy thresholds users are setting today.