I had an AI generate a TLDR:

The essay analyzes a paper on privacy attacks against the Lightning Network (LN), highlighting three key attacks:

- Peeling Attack: Identifies unannounced channels by tracking "peeling chains" of channel openings and closures. It can find unannounced channels but only if they are part of a peel chain, and it doesn't reveal balances during the channel's operation.

- Targeted Probing Attack: Guesses the internal balances of some channels by sending payment probes through them. However, within the channel, it only determines an upper bound on one party's balance, a lower bound on the other's, and was not tried on unannounced channels.

- AOH (Assume One Hop) Attack: Assumes that most payments have only one hop, guessing the sender and recipient based on this. The attack guessed correctly 56% of the time -- little better than a coinflip -- on a simulated network that is smaller than the real LN, with no unannounced channels. It is also less effective in modern LN, where rendezvous routing is common, and the sender doesn't always choose the shortest path.

The paper's assumptions, such as the prevalence of shortest-path routing, are outdated, making some attacks less relevant today.