Nostr Web Client

Pay a bonus to the winning share that finds a block. In a PPLNS payout system this changes the cost of a block withholding attack from 50/50 pool/attacker to >50% cost to the attacker. Scale the size of the payout to your liking.

This is preferable to more heavy handed monitoring schemes because it doesn't compromise privacy or require undue protocol complexity.

Doesn't work for FPPS because FPPS sucks. It is dangerous to all of bitcoin and we must stamp it out.

Come see my talk at nostr:nprofile1qqsxhwmaw842y4zzzk580cfke4l5jr6xyh44v3v6pk59dnyzjm2a7vqcd5flv Austin in May to learn more.

vnprc 10mo ago

> this changes the cost of a block withholding attack from 50/50 pool/attacker to >50% cost to the attacker

This is incorrect, but concise. The cost to block withhold attack a PPLNS pool is exactly in line with the hashrate used to make the attack. In other words if an attacker uses 100 TH/s in a block withholding attack, they cause themselves and the pool an equal amount of damage. All miners lose out on the potential rewards of those 100TH, but so does the attacker. Meanwhile, the pool continues to pay out rewards to the attacker as if that 100TH/s was mining honestly.

If the pool pays an extra 5% to the share that wins a block, now the block withholding attack costs the attacker 5% more and the victims 5% less.

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vnprc 10mo ago

nostr:nprofile1qqsq9k04vahllseell55m74n3047y88pzlr0z5yany32st29fapqmgsppemhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyv9kh2uewd9hj7qgawaehxw309ahx7um5wghxy6t5vdhkjmn9wgh8xmmrd9skctc87ckyu I believe y'all could build this today. Something to keep in mind if your luck suddenly takes a dive.

vnprc 10mo ago

This is still wrong. What matters is the proportion of attacker hashrate to honest hashrate. In pure PPLNS an attacker forgoes rewards directly porportional to this ratio. By giving the block winning share a greater reward you can put your thumb on the scale.