The CIA’s Intelligence Allies: What the New JFK Files Reveal About Agency Partnerships
When the National Archives dropped a new batch of JFK assassination-related documents on March 18, 2025, history buffs and conspiracy theorists alike pored over the pages, searching for clues about November 22, 1963. While the files don’t rewrite the official story—that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone—they pull back the curtain on the CIA’s Cold War alliances with other intelligence agencies. From the FBI to military branches and beyond, these records sketch a web of collaboration, secrecy, and occasional tension that defined the CIA’s world in the early 1960s. Here’s what the files tell us about who the CIA worked with, how they interacted, and what it might mean for the lingering questions around JFK’s death.
The FBI: Partners in the Domestic-Foreign Divide
The CIA’s closest dance partner in these files is the FBI, with the two agencies sharing intelligence and splitting duties across the domestic-foreign line. Take the May 27, 1963, CIA report on the Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria (FIUR), a Cuban exile group plotting against Castro 124-10213-10483. The CIA drafted it, but the FBI took it from there, routing copies to its Washington and San Juan offices to track figures like Julio Leal in Florida. It’s a classic handoff: the CIA gathers overseas intel, and the FBI follows up stateside.
Another gem is a November 21, 1960, memo from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the CIA’s S. H. Horton 124-90138-10073. Hoover details the Soviet Embassy in Havana ordering ten safes from the Mosler Safe Company—complete with serial numbers and combinations. The FBI sniffed this out and passed it to the CIA, hinting at a joint effort to crack Soviet secrets in Cuba. Then there’s the 1963 FBI interviews with CIA operatives like Serge Peter Karlow 124-90092-10016, probing a “riotous operation” in Vienna from the 1950s—likely a security check with assassination leads in mind.
The vibe? A well-oiled machine, but not without shadows. The CIA shares raw intel, the FBI digs domestically, yet redactions—like “1B restrictions”—suggest some details stayed need-to-know, even between allies. Did this secrecy hide anything about Oswald, who rubbed elbows with Cuban exiles in 1963? The files don’t say, but the gap teases the question.
Military Intelligence: The Muscle Behind the Curtain
The U.S. military—Army, Navy, Air Force—pops up as a steady CIA collaborator, blending operational muscle with intelligence grunt work. The FIUR report 124-10213-10483 credits an Air Force rep for developing the intel, showing military personnel embedded in CIA ops—likely tapping their Cuban expertise. The report went out to all three branches, plus the FBI, and later, they pushed to downgrade its classification, hinting at a shared stake in the info.
A 1967 report on a Mexican clash 124-10279-10020 takes it further, listing Army, Navy, Air Force, and the National Military Command Center (think Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs) as recipients. This wasn’t casual CC’ing—the CIA wanted the brass looped in on Latin American unrest that could ripple to U.S. defenses. The interaction feels systematic: the CIA leads, the military supports and assesses, but their push for declassification suggests they weren’t as wedded to secrecy as the CIA. A subtle tug-of-war over transparency, perhaps?
The Government Alphabet Soup: State, NSA, DIA, and More
The CIA didn’t stop at the FBI and military—it cast a wide net across U.S. government agencies. That 1967 Mexico report 124-10279-10020 lists a who’s-who: State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), United States Information Agency, and a slew of CIA internal offices like Current Intelligence and Research and Reports. Even the Coast Guard got a copy! It’s a flood of intel, ensuring everyone from spymasters to diplomats stayed in the loop.
But not all was rosy. A June 1961 memo from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to JFK 176-10033-10145 dishes dirt on the CIA-State Department relationship. Schlesinger gripes that the State Department had “nominal supervision” over CIA covert ops but no real clout—the CIA handed over plans too late to tweak. This autonomy, turbocharged when John Foster Dulles (State) and brother Allen Dulles (CIA) ran the show in the 1950s, left State sidelined. The CIA shared intel, sure, but it didn’t like taking orders—a friction that could’ve muddied U.S. policy in Kennedy’s era.
How They Worked Together—and Didn’t
The files paint a picture of a CIA at the hub of a sprawling intelligence wheel. It churned out reports, like the FIUR scoop or the Soviet safes tip, then fired them off to the FBI, military, and beyond, often with “No Foreign Dissem” tags to keep it in-house. Operationally, the Air Force pitched in on Cuba, while the FBI vetted CIA folks like Karlow—teamwork with the CIA calling shots. But Schlesinger’s memo reveals a catch: the CIA’s lone-wolf streak meant it dodged oversight, especially from State, risking missteps or blind spots.
Surprises That Raise Eyebrows
A few tidbits jump out. Karlow’s “riotous operation” in Vienna 124-90092-10016 is a wild card—12–15 trips to a spy-riddled city, one gone haywire, and barely a whisper about it since. Did the military or FBI know more? The Soviet safes memo 124-90138-10073 is another stunner—down to lock combos, it’s the kind of detail that screams “let’s crack it open,” showing FBI-CIA teamwork at its sneakiest. And Schlesinger’s unredacted jab at CIA publicity stunts after Guatemala and Iran ops 176-10033-10145—nearly blowing their cover for a pat on the back—hints at an agency too cocky for its own good, or State’s.
Echoes in Dallas?
The Warren Commission says Oswald flew solo, and these files don’t argue otherwise—directly. But they stir the pot. The CIA-FBI Cuban exile watch 124-10213-10483 overlapped with Oswald’s 1963 New Orleans antics, yet he slipped through. The CIA’s State Department dodge 176-10033-10145 suggests it might’ve hoarded intel, missing chances to flag Oswald. And that Vienna operation 124-90092-10016? It’s a stretch, but Oswald’s Soviet stint (1959–1962) could’ve pinged the same radar—if anyone connected the dots.
The files don’t prove a conspiracy, but the CIA’s tight grip on secrets, even from allies, and those pesky redactions fuel doubt. Did the FBI miss Oswald because the CIA held back? Did State’s weak leash let something slip? No answers here, just shadows.
A Web of Spies, Then and Now
As of March 22, 2025, these files spotlight the CIA’s Cold War crew: the FBI for home turf, the military for muscle, and a government alphabet soup for backup—State included, grudgingly. They shared intel like pros, teamed up when it suited, but the CIA’s solo streak kept it a wild card. Surprises like Vienna and Soviet safes show a deeper game than we knew, while Schlesinger’s warning flags a flaw that might’ve mattered in ’63. The JFK story stays officially lone-gunman, but these partnerships—or their cracks—keep us wondering: what didn’t they share, and why?