https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2013/11/07/bitcoin-isnt-so-broken-after-all/ nostr:note1ud28pujeczpp4xeqg0q57aemdeamhk6vnn0uz2l7px0vmguppqpqec4dlx
Discussion
“ As a result, a coalition of ES-miners is not stable. In short, a coalition of ES-miners cannot form and will not survive.”
Not a thorough analysis…. This idea comes up a lot that somehow coalitions won’t form because people could break them and form other coalitions. 1) Actual coalitional game theory has notions of kernel and nucleus and stable set etc that take further horse trading into consideration 2) Empirically in the real world coalitions do form and tend to have cohesion, the real world is not zero viscosity
1) Yes… kernel as a set of payoffs where no subgroup of players can improve their situation by breaking away & forming a new coalition. And the nucleus represents another concept of ‘stability’, considering both cooperation & competition among coalitions..
2) Given the real existence of mining pools (coalitions) in Bitcoin mining, the need for stability & cohesion within these pools, we could formulate a mathematical problem that would optimize the allocation of rewards between miners within a mining pool to ensure long-term stability & equity while taking into account factors such as contributions, risks & external competition…
Algorithm or mechanism: optimization of the distribution of rewards within a mining pool:
Miners are incentivized to stay within the pool, avoiding the temptation to leave & form new coalitions.
The distribution is fair, considering each miner's computational power, investment & risk.
The mechanism is resistant to manipulation & external competition, ensuring long-term pool stability.