even if a keychain was somehow secure and restricted access to that program only, you are only a memory dump away from getting the key

and since it’s same user that can be done with no privileges

it should be viewed as a way to delegate encryption at rest of secrets to the OS, nothing else

but you really should just do FDE

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also bitlocker can kindly eat shit because it is set up with TPM dependance by default

so if you even dare to boot a linux ISO with secure boot on, that will cause a change to the EFI keys list to add your distribution key and change the PCRs, therefore invalidating the TPM key and make bitlocker ask you for the recovery key stored on your MS account you were never told about

Is there no way to used key stretching to encrypt the key in RAM again?

where do you store the key for encrypting the key in RAM

in RAM of course

In a secure element if possible.