The tone and the line of questioning is perceivably antaganostic and hostile for unknown reasons. Much has been stated with great confidence however lacking substance and demonstrating a lack of use and familiarity of the very thing having remarks laid against it.

> Does GrapheneOS allow to choose which type of connection applications can use like in DivestOS?

👇

>Network Restriction: DivestOS already lets you restrict network for each app by connection type (cellular/Wi-Fi/VPN), when in the background, and optionally completely revoke NETWORK permission.

Yes GrapheneOS has the exact same functionality, DivestOS Network toggle is the exact same developed by GrapheneOS.

> GrapheneOS is not a reliable project because unreliable people stand behind it.

Remarkable claim with unremarkable evidence. You'll likely tout clout chasing trust abusing and extortionist "influencers" claims, where one in particular is a card carrying Kiwi Farms member immersed in their targeted harrassment campaigns being encouraged and encouraging in equal measure. Unreliable narrators all.

> Another thing is that GrapheneOS builds a walled garden and forces people to use their servers. You claim that you're security espert. Have you noticed that GOS forces to use their server to sync the clock? Maybe you think that you can have accurate time using manual setting?

Nobody is walled in, nobody is forced to use anything, all default connections are routed via GOS servers or proxies but can be done through stock Google or other provider. Users can use either/or OR none dependent on the connection in question.

> GOS is a perfect tool to fingerprint and track journalist and dissidents.

This is why Edward Snowden Chair of Freedom of the Press Foundation uses it every day and Citizenlabs team members have recommended it to high value targets etc.

> DivestOS allows to make updates over Tor, DivestOS has repository with apps within Tor- .onion address.

DivestOS has .onion address of their site.

Our updater will update the app via any connection if using Orbot/VPN etc.

Can you provide any details of GOS to confirm claim that GOS is pro privacy and has astonishing approach to the security vs. DivestOS?

grapheneos.org all auditable and verifiable should anyone choose to do so.

Can you provide any details to backup your extraordinary claims?

Could you upload a screenshot of this feature in GrapheneOS - I can't find it.

I only found Network permission.

>>Network Restriction: DivestOS already lets you restrict network for each app by connection type (cellular/Wi-Fi/VPN), when in the background, and optionally completely revoke NETWORK permission.

>Yes GrapheneOS has the exact same functionality, DivestOS Network toggle is the exact same developed by GrapheneOS.

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nostr:npub1gd3h5vg6zhcuy5a46crh32m4gjkx8xugu95wwgj2jqx55sfgxxpst7cn8c where can I find in GraoheneOS this settings i.e. restrict network for each app by connection type: cellular/wifi/vpn?

>>Network Restriction: DivestOS already lets you restrict network for each app by connection type (cellular/Wi-Fi/VPN), when in the background, and optionally completely revoke NETWORK permission.

>Yes GrapheneOS has the exact same functionality, DivestOS Network toggle is the exact same developed by GrapheneOS.

GrapheneOS lies everywhere. This is from their forum. Those settings are implemented in DivestOS.

Another thing is that DivestOS does not recommend using MicroG.

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/8831-suggest-features-for-more-privacy

" GrapheneOS

In app info, under "Mobile data and Wi-Fi, implement a large range of toggles(allow network, Mobile data, Background data, VPN data, unrestricted data usage) instead of only background data and Unrestricted data usage.

These toggles from LineageOS don't work correctly. DivestOS didn't include them. GrapheneOS won't be adding leaky features. Our Network toggle does not have leaks itself like these toggles. App communication allows apps to communicate within a profile which means you rely on apps enforcing the permission model. Our App Communication Scopes feature will provide the ability to control this within profiles rather than needing to split up apps via separate profiles."

This post from GrapheneOS forum confirms that nostr:npub1gd3h5vg6zhcuy5a46crh32m4gjkx8xugu95wwgj2jqx55sfgxxpst7cn8c lied above in his statement. Those people are 100% unreliable.