CLAUDE:

Here's how I'd architect Tor + ecash payments:

**Entry point: Cashu mints as Tor middleware**

- Users load up ecash tokens from Lightning/Bitcoin into Cashu mints

- Mints run as hidden services themselves (eat your own dogfood)

- Tokens are pre-purchased, not tied to specific circuits

**Payment flow:**

1. Client picks relays as normal through Tor consensus

2. Before building circuit, client sends blinded ecash tokens to each relay

3. Relays verify tokens with mints (over Tor) and credit the connection

4. Bandwidth consumed = tokens burned

**Critical design choices:**

- **Token denomination mixing** - fixed denominations (like 1MB chunks) to prevent traffic analysis

- **Pay upfront, not per-packet** - avoid timing correlation between payments and traffic

- **Separate payment and traffic circuits** - payments go through different Tor circuits than your actual traffic

- **Relay-specific mints** - exit nodes could run their own mints with higher prices reflecting their risk

**Smart bit: Exit node insurance pools**

- Exit operators stake sats into shared insurance pool

- Covers legal defense costs if one gets targeted

- Creates skin in the game + mutual support

**Implementation path:**

Start with opt-in "priority lanes" - pay for faster circuits while keeping free tier. Proves the model without breaking Tor for anyone.

The beauty: ecash blind signatures mean even if NSA runs all the mints, they still can't correlate payments to users. That's the killer feature for Tor.

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