All data in transit is encrypted.
AFAIK there is no storage of third-party data for node operators, nor way to know what is transmitted within I2P.
In the western world you are legally permitted to transmit encrypted data without legal obligation to monitor what is inside. There are attempts to change that situation as seen in the EU this week.
This doesn't mean you can't be personally targeted, governments do that often to just about anyone.
Yes, and what if someone tries to convict me for transmitting encrypted data?
Also, what if someone lives outside of the USA? Should they just use Tor instead?
Sorry, I had poor reading comprehension. Ignore mu first question and focus on my second one. I just want to say that if I am transmitting other people's encrypted data, I am more at risk of being targeted than if I am only sending and recieving my own encrypted data.
Yes, that is correct.
Being a node operator in I2P is undoubtedly safer than the same on Tor, still you are a target.
There are ways to harden even more the privacy but the bandwidth costs are quite heavy.
How is relaying encrypted CP any safer on I2P? Yoy are doing the exact same thing, the only difference is that on I2P, EVERYONE is relaying rather than just the people who live in a safe jurisdiction and who are prepared to fight a frivolous legal battle.
The functioning is completely different. Please take the time to read it from their website.
What's the matter? I thought you were interested in this topic! Now that it's time to go into the actual details of the system you get cold feet?
I think you'll find that the parts that actually matter are exactly the same. Nodes relay arbitrary encrypted traffic from an unknown source to an unknown destination. The biggest difference between the two is that EVERYONE relays traffic, not just people who specifically volunteer. Sorry, but that model just doesn't work.
Just not in the mood of convincing anyone when their website is doing a good work explaining the difference.
I'm not even the biggest fan of either options, just that one option is far safer than the other for the moment.
Interesting enough, NOSTR does have the potential to be stronger than either of those options. This year I'm busy with radio comms but maybe next year we can dedicate time to create a solid prototype.
I'm good. I like Tor's model better than anything else I've seen, including I2P. Everything I've heard against Tor so far just comes off as FUD. Not to mention how much more mature Tor is than its alternatives.
That is just being willingfuly wrong. I'm sorry but I'm not seeing this conversation as serious any longer and will therefore step out.
A government-owned VPN is NEVER a good option.
To remember, another person got arrested this week for ignoring that simple fact: https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-jailed-u-s-tor-operator-persecuted-by-fbi-after-refusing-decrypt-requests/20576
This is the same person. He signed up to run a Tor node. He also a convicted criminal. Even if you do buy the story here, people like him are probably not the best people to run Nodes. What a crazy notion: different people have different threat models.
Also, the Tor network is neither a VPN nor is it "government-owned." VPNs rely on centralized trust; you have to trust the person running the VPN not to track you. Services like Tor and I2P use a decentralized trust model. Everyone running nodes and relaying your communications is a volunteer. Once you switch to a decentralized trust model, attempting to choose only the most trustworthy people to send one's data to can actually make a person LESS secure.
You see this all the time. People get paranoid that those around them are out to get them, so they cut more and more people out of their lives until there is nobody left to defend or support them when something actually DOES happen to them. So what if some of the nodes are evil? Better to have a single evil node that's too scared to show it's hand than try to do everything on my own, or use a network with an objectively bad model.
