It is possible, there just isn't a "global" agreed upon consensus — and that is fine. It is not as complicated as it has been made to sound.

PGP has key signing and revocation, that's pretty much all that is needed.

The use case is valid. If someone's PGP key is compromised, I've seen it happen, they need to revoke the key, create a new one and then have coworkers, friends and etc. sign the new one, done.

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PGP key revocation relies on keyservers, so it's not reasonable.

https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips/pull/829 has a somewhat-comparable model that may work for Nostr, but anchored on more solid grounds.

I've read all of these.

1. It is not needed to opentimestamp the revocation (migration) event.

2. It isn't even necessary to indicate what key is being migrated to with the revocation event.

Profile attesations (like PGP key signing) can tag both the new and old key, and this can help people follow their new key. The revocation event informs people the key can not be trusted and to seek alternatives (and for those attestation events).

3. There also isn't a need to whitelist keys. Confirmation of the profile can happen in any number of ways "out-of-band".