The so-called "large miners" can fork off if they want, according to the illustrious MrHodl , your incumbent node will probably never even notice (even though there may chain tip drama behind the scenes)
I guess you'll want to check in on what's happening when you need/want to make an on-chain transaction
Miners can certainly initiate their own Drivechain soft fork. The question is whether they can maintain it.
The instant that a majority of hash is not defending the escrow, it’ll drain to the defecting miners. In effect, the sidechain escrow acts as a bounty, begging miners to drop the fork and take it.
This is why Drivechain truly needs the support of node operators. Nodes must be willing to invalidate the escrow piracy attempts, otherwise miners are incentivized to defect.
Ah, thanks for outlining this scenario... So if most node operators don't upgrade their node to "version drive chain" than the bitcoin locked up in drivechains would likely get pillaged to the point that no one would risk locking up bitcoin in a drivechain?
And a URSF would be a preemptive way of node operators signalling that they wouldn't "drivechain" at this point?
Nodes can signal whatever they like, but it’s an unreliable metric. A malicious actor could spin up any number of zombie nodes to Sybil whatever signal they prefer.
This was a concern during the BIP148 UASF of 2017. Many nodes were announcing their intent to enforce the fork, but nobody knew how many of those nodes represented real people’s actual interests.
For this reason, the #UASF campaign on Twitter was an important additional signal showing support.
Nope, don't listen to this guy it fake info and he's pulling shit out of their ass.
yes
If node operators are not enforcing the fork, then it is in every miner’s immediate financial interest to assign to themselves the escrow coin. For this reason, I predict that the coin will be swept (cold, hard incentives).
One could make the argument that miners’ long term interests are better served by keeping the drivechain going (that is, by safeguarding the escrow). The question is whether miners (mining pools, specifically) believe that it is in sufficient quantity to ignore defector’s blocks.
Do miners have the collective will to keep each other’s hands out of the cookie jar?
False
