Although...?
Wouldn't this also apply to any webclient you authorized with nsec-input and then connected to a wallet? It's just a website connected to your wallet, in that case, with the nsec as login data.
Or is there some additional control?
Although...?
Wouldn't this also apply to any webclient you authorized with nsec-input and then connected to a wallet? It's just a website connected to your wallet, in that case, with the nsec as login data.
Or is there some additional control?
Fair enough, the only corner case may be if an attacker collects X nsec (with X being tens of thousands or more) and then in an exact time T he/she runs some script to sign an event that changes the LNaddress for any nsec he/she holds. In that case he/she could quietly wait until someone figures this out and spreads the news a time T+1 This empowers the attacker to steal only the zaps occurred between T and T+1, given that after T+1 people would stop zapping each other as a precaution.
The danger here is possibly bigger from the trust pov rather than economical...am I going to zap someone anymore if I'm not sure that the npub I'm zapping is actually in control of its lnaddress?
Just riffing btw, but clients where you login with plain nsec are possibly dangerous, I agree
For a while, that was how most of us where doing it, most of the time.