“OP_RETURN was always just bound by the maximum transaction size. We are not opening up anything now at the consensus level.”

- I assume you are referring to the fact that nodes can change their data carrier size to allow for 100kb. By default all core nodes prior v30 only allow for 80 + 3 bytes of op_return. The defaults are very important because most people run the defaults. This means that it is very hard to have your larger than 80 byte op_return file relayed across the p2p network, as most nodes do not relay this transaction. This also disincentives miners not to include this transaction as there is a higher risk of their block going “stale” if they do.

Regarding “the blame would be on the protocol either way” I’d say there’s a difference. If a bad actor must bypass the default P2P path by submitting directly to a cooperating miner or mining the block themselves, responsibility is clearly on the actor and the cooperating miner. If Core’s default changes so that most nodes relay large OP_RETURNs, that plausible-deniability vanishes because the network defaults now support large data relay, and the perception shifts toward the protocol. The anonymity of the miner/bad actor does not really matter in this case because whether the miner is known or not, it’s the perception of how that illicit data was included on chain and whether it was supported by the p2p network, or the network had to be bypassed because it did not support it.

Reply to this note

Please Login to reply.

Discussion

Interesting aspect that miners would exclude big, unpopular transactions as others wouldn't be able to validate those quickly thus resulting in a delay that translates into an orphan risk.

If big OP_RETURNS are evil always and thus have to be filtered out by policy, by your argument, the network would have to ban those by consensus and not just by flimsy policy or else, the network is complicit again. I guess that's a slippery slope.

I think it’s incorrect to say mempool policy is flimsy. As of today, 99% of all op_return transactions are under the 80 byte default max relay limit. Policy is very effective at filtering out transactions on individual nodes’ mempools.

In my opinion a consensus change is not necessary because filters in their current state disincentivise spammers to the point where they have to use exploits or bypass the p2p network. Because of this, its clear bitcoin in its current state is for monetary transactions only. If someone wants to put illegal data on chain by using an exploit or bypassing the p2p network, or in other words “jump the fence”, technically nothing is stopping them, but I don’t think the fault and legal responsibility lies with bitcoin in this instance. However, if nodes start to relay large continuous data chunks by default (ie, this behaviour is now supported by the network), I think some fault can and will be put on bitcoin.

And yes the risk of miners having their block orphaned is important and is a reminder that the miners serve the nodes, not the other way around.

I'm with you regarding most of what you say but can't speak to the legal interpretation at all. It certainly depends on the jurisdiction.