People have the option of federated sidechains or federated mints. Could even split funds into several different federations if we get to the point where there is that much demand. Or maybe one day covenant-based scaling. It costs less than a dollar to send an on-chain transaction now, 14 years into this project.
-We don't even fully know what new scaling options will exist in a decade.
-We don't really know what % of people will want to directly use main-chain money within a decade.
I'm all for these custodial or semi-custodial options, but it doesn't hurt to give people the option of using a non-custodial decentralized (even if not "trustless") mechanism for sharing utxos too, like the hashrate escrow.
After 14 years we don't have anything near hyperbitcoinization, which is the goal of every sane person, and fees are probably only still relatively cheap today because SegWit did a mandatory blocksize increase.
No non-custodial offchain mechanism will ever be able to bypass the lower limit of requiring trustless payments to be bigger than the fees required for an onchain transaction. If we expect fees to increase -- and we must if we want Bitcoin to continue to be safe -- we must also expect that less and less transactions will continue to be viable.
There are only two solutions: custodial stuff and Drivechain. If no argument can be made that Drivechain breaks Bitcoin then activating it is the reasonable course of action.
Fuck no. The burden of proof falls on the proposal.
No Bruh, you need that thing that the guy is working on.
A trust generation ritual to counter the trustless system, otherwise it won't work
What guy?
What if a drive chain becomes more valuable to the miners than the main chain? Could leverage then be applied on miners to censor transactions on the base Bitcoin layer?
For example, if a drivechain is locking up CBDC money and issuing a privacy focused stable coin to allow people to bypass CBDC surveillance it could become very popular and grow so that transaction fees for miners are an orders of magnitude greater than mining Bitcoin on the base layer. The government could threaten to erase the held CBDC if miners don't censor Bitcoin transactions on the main chain. This would cause a fork, with the majority of mining power going to the fork that is censoring transactions in order to be able to mine fees on the drivechain holding the CBDC. The smaller, non-censoring fork would be vulnerable to 51%attack
The drivechain would have its own consensus mechanism and miners.
Aren't drivechains proposed to be bind merge mined with Bitcoin?
Yep, but in this model the sidechain has its own miners who produce blocks and collect fees.
The multiple sidechains then compete in an auction to pay the highest Bitcoin transaction fee so that their hash is included in the base layer blockchain. This is only required to peg out of the sidechain and withdraw BTC back to the base layer.
In your example, the CBDC administrators could censor any transaction they like within their sidechain and do not require participation or collusion from Bitcoin miners.
