just shut up and use monero

that's the creed of the Zen maximalist religion

podcasters

A layer 1 node doesn’t need to validate Lightning transactions.

The same can be achieved for other layer 2 networks offering privacy / throughput / data storage etc.

You don’t need drivechains for privacy.

what i’m trying to say isn’t that WBTC is good, im saying that BIP300 does nothing to stop miners from stealing

the legal ramifications for DAO members alone makes WBTC objectively more rational than BIP300, because BIP300 basically has nothing

explain why you think miners stealing is baseless- it’s become a meme phrase for you guys/paul but you never elaborate outside of UASF (in which case it is def not baseless).

i’m not saying others shouldn’t use it, im saying it does not work. my bet is that immediately upon activation it will be used to create a replacement for WBTC, will gain massive locked-in TVL over a short period before being rugged by miners (along with any other escrows).

it will turn so many people off bitcoin, all for something that was never gonna work in the first place.

#BIP300? Fork around and find out.

The #drivechain #BIP300 debate is reminiscent of the 2017 block size increase debate.

Although both sides have technical arguments to support their position at its core, the disagreement boils down to whether #Bitcoin should be kept as it or be upgraded.

It’s all about Bitcoin politics: Bitcoin conservatism Vs Bitcoin progressivism.

Bitcoin conservatism will never die unless the conservatives lose the Bitcoin brand or the progressists succeed in building a Bitcoin fork that will surpass #BTC adoption.

i think the anti-BIP300 arguments get too convoluted (51% attacks, MEV?, creates miner centralisation).

keep it simple- the game theory of it fails. economically, miners are overwhelmingly incentivised to steal. i believe any meaningful amount of drivechain TVL will be stolen by miners voting for a WT^ transaction that splits the escrow by pool % hashpower- no offchain coordination required.

why turn bitcoin into a laughing stock?

lol

Engagement seems to have completely backfired on him, revealing his bcasher backings and totally misalligned VC incentives. BIP 300 ngmi

Makes sense. It sounds like the merge mining revenue comes out of the escrowed funds then.

The degree to which this constitutes “additional” revenue would be a function of how it compares to the mainchain revenue lost in reduced fee pressure, I would imagine.

Miner activated soft fork was such an ace card. Paul must have been sitting on that little Yugioh monster card for ages.

It was the nuclear option.

When the arguments against Bip-300 became so obviously empty, vicious and biased by devs of competing projects whom non-technical Bitcoiners trust, he pushed the big red button.

Don't trust, Verify. IS bitcoin.

"...miners can activate bip 300 and sovereign nodes remain sovereign. Nothing changes for them..."

Do you mean sidechain fees (via merged mining) or mainchain fees or both?

Merge mining fee revenue

> the prize for a 51% attacker would quickly become worthless since the value of Bitcoin would fall when people realized that mining was controlled by one entity.

I’m more optimistic, personally, because of the possible market responses to such an attack. Censored parties can increase fees to incentivize non-censoring miners to join the network, for example.

You’re right that honest miners are disincentivized from establishing a standing majority to avoid this risk under the status quo. We have seen this empirically as miners move hash between pools when any gets too large.

I don’t know if the existential risk is sufficient to dissuade an attacker from attempting a majority escrow sweep. It is a different category of prize from previous 51% attacks, which require history rewriting.

An otherwise honest pool (or cohort of cooperating pools) can sweep escrow without rewriting history. The game theory of these interactions is not clear cut, IMO, and what we’re gambling with here is the finest money ever devised.

> Drivechains is designed to give miners more revenue.

I’ve heard Sztorc make this claim. But the mechanism is unclear to me.

As I understand it, miner revenue can come from three possible sources: block subsidy, fees, and direct payments.

The block subsidy schedule is immutable, ruling that out. So does this alleged increase in miner income arise from increased on-chain fees? Or via direct payments?

Why?