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Hu₿ertus the Austrian
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Bitcredit Protocol: No more on/off ramps Bitcoin for the real economy www.bit.cr

The crypto anarchist theory may be “complete” but I say it throws out the babe with the bathwater, seeks unrealistic individualism where mankind needs to organise realistic voluntarily cooperation and where unfettered authority needs decentralised checks. It is not a matter of throwing it all out, the job is to add what’s missing.

So, as wealth and prosperity need specialisation combined with rule-bound cooperation, I think that there are two missing elements to go to a proper democracy:

(1) Methods and systems (to build) which help us get to good rules and abolish bad ones, which work for the general good without unjustified power to loud minorities. The best one I could devise I call statistically-representative democracy, it is a massively-parallel decentralised institution with enormous bandwidth to handle such issues. We will use the principle for the governance of Bitcredit Protocol.

(2) Methods and systems (to build) which help us to appoint individuals to executive positions limited to manage missions as per (1) while ensuring control and liability. An intriguing decentralised method for this was devised in ancient Venice for the election of the Doge, a modernised version could revolutionise executive appointments in modern times.

Replying to Avatar Max

In 1912, a merchant in Ceylon could sell tea to a buyer in London without either party touching gold or waiting months for payment. The seller drew a bill of exchange on the buyer, payable in ninety days. A local bank purchased the bill at a small discount, giving the seller immediate funds. The bill then traveled to London, where it traded in liquid markets until maturity, when it settled in gold. No government coordinated this. No central bank managed it. The system had evolved over centuries, financing the majority of world trade through private commercial paper backed by real goods.

Two years later, it was dead.

Understanding what was lost requires understanding what a bill of exchange actually was and how it moved through the world.

### The Instrument

A bill of exchange is fundamentally a peer-to-peer instrument. Two merchants, a buyer and a seller, can create, transfer, and settle a bill without any bank, broker, or financial intermediary touching it. Banks eventually emerged to provide convenience, but they were never necessary. The mechanism predates modern banking by centuries and operated between merchants long before anyone formalized the role of discount house or acceptance house. Every intermediary that later grew up around bills existed to make the system faster or more liquid, not to make it possible.

With that understood, here is the anatomy of the instrument.

A bill of exchange is a written, unconditional order from one party commanding another to pay a specified sum on a specified future date. It is not a promise to pay, like a promissory note. It is an order, a command, drawn by a creditor upon a debtor. Three parties appear on its face: the drawer who creates and signs it, the drawee who is ordered to pay, and the payee who will receive payment. In most commercial transactions, the drawer and payee were the same person: the seller, who drew the bill on his buyer and made it payable to himself.

No bank is required to create a bill. No financial institution must bless the transaction. A seller with paper and ink draws on a buyer who accepts, and a negotiable instrument exists. The bill is a creature of contract between merchants, not a product dispensed by financial intermediaries. Banks entered this system as service providers competing for the merchant's business, not as gatekeepers controlling access to credit.

The bill states its face value, its usance (the term until payment, typically thirty, sixty, or ninety days), and the name and location of the drawee. A wool merchant in Sydney selling one thousand pounds of fleece to a Manchester textile manufacturer would write something like: "At ninety days sight, pay to my order the sum of One Thousand Pounds Sterling," addressed to the manufacturer, signed by himself. This piece of paper, until accepted, was merely a claim that the Sydney merchant asserted against the Manchester buyer.

### Acceptance

The bill travels to the drawee, who may accept or refuse it. Acceptance transforms the bill from an assertion into an obligation. The drawee writes "Accepted" across the face, signs, and dates it. From that moment, he is the acceptor, primarily liable for payment at maturity. The bill becomes negotiable, tradeable, almost as liquid as money itself.

For international trade, a complication arose: the seller in Sydney might not know whether the buyer in Manchester was creditworthy, and no one in Sydney might know either. This problem generated one of the bill market's key institutions: the acceptance house. These were merchant banks, often founded by families with trading connections across multiple countries, who would accept bills on behalf of buyers for a small fee. When Baring Brothers or Rothschild or Kleinwort or Schröder or Hambro accepted a bill, they added their name and guarantee to the instrument. The original buyer remained obligated to reimburse the acceptance house, but the world could now trade the bill based on the acceptor's reputation rather than the unknown buyer's.

But acceptance houses were optional. A seller who knew his buyer's reputation, or who could verify it through his own network, needed no intermediary. The buyer accepted the bill himself, and the seller either held it to maturity or found someone willing to discount it based on the buyer's name alone. Acceptance houses served merchants who lacked direct knowledge of distant counterparties. They competed fiercely for this business, and any merchant bank with sufficient capital and reputation could enter the trade. No charter, no license, no government permission. The barrier to entry was having the knowledge to judge creditworthiness and the capital to back that judgment. An acceptance house's willingness to put its name on a bill was itself a judgment of creditworthiness, made by people with strong incentives to judge correctly and priced by a market that punished errors ruthlessly.

### Discounting

The Sydney merchant now holds an accepted bill payable in ninety days. He wants money now. He has options.

He might hold the bill himself and present it at maturity. He might pay his own suppliers by endorsing the bill over to them, who accept it because they know his reputation and can verify the acceptor's. He might sell it to a wealthy neighbor with idle capital seeking safe short-term returns. The bill circulates as a negotiable instrument in its own right, passing from hand to hand among merchants, investors, and speculators who trade claims on future gold the way others trade commodities. No bank need be involved at all.

But banks and discount houses competed aggressively for this business, because bills were among the safest and most liquid assets available. In London alone, a dozen major discount houses and scores of smaller bill brokers bid against each other for paper. Overend, Gurney and Company. The National Discount Company. The Union Discount Company. Alexander and Company. Samuel Montagu. Countless smaller operators. Each maintained relationships with merchants across the empire, each sought to offer better rates or faster service, each knew that a merchant dissatisfied with the terms could walk across the street to a competitor.

The merchant takes his bill to one of these houses, which purchases it at a discount from face value. If the discount rate is four percent annually, a ninety-day bill for one thousand pounds sells for approximately nine hundred ninety pounds. The merchant receives immediate payment. The discounter will collect the full face value at maturity, earning roughly ten pounds for ninety days of waiting and risk-bearing.

Competition kept discount rates low. A house that charged too much lost business to rivals. A house that accepted too much bad paper suffered losses and lost its own access to credit. The market disciplined both greed and recklessness simultaneously. Provincial merchants could discount locally or send bills to London for the keenest rates. London discount houses could rediscount with each other or, in extremity, with the Bank of England. At every level, alternatives existed.

The discount rate is distinct from the interest rate, though modern economists often conflate them. The interest rate reflects the time preference for money: the premium required to postpone consumption. The discount rate reflects the scarcity of clearing: how urgently holders of bills need to convert them to cash. When trade expands and bills multiply, the discount rate rises. When trade contracts, it falls. This price signal coordinates the entire system without central direction.

When the merchant sells the bill, he endorses it: signs his name on the back. This endorsement is not merely a transfer of ownership. It is a guarantee.

### The Guarantee Chain

Every endorser of a bill guarantees its payment. This is the mechanism that made the system self-regulating. As the bill circulates from hand to hand, each new holder endorses it to the next, and each endorsement adds another guarantor to the chain.

Consider a bill that passes through six hands before maturity: from the original drawer in Sydney to a local bank, to a London correspondent bank, to a bill broker, to a discount house, and finally to an investor who holds it to maturity. Each of these parties has endorsed the bill. Each has guaranteed payment.

At maturity, the investor presents the bill to the acceptor for payment. If the acceptor pays, the transaction completes and all parties are released from their guarantees. The bill is marked paid and ceases to exist.

But suppose the acceptor cannot pay. Perhaps the Manchester manufacturer has gone bankrupt. The investor holds a dishonored bill. He has it "protested," a formal notarization recording the refusal to pay. Now the guarantee chain activates.

The investor may claim the full amount from any endorser or from the original drawer. He might pursue the discount house that sold him the bill, which then pursues the bill broker, which pursues the London bank, which pursues the Sydney bank, which pursues the original drawer. Alternatively, the investor might skip intermediaries and claim directly from the drawer. Each party who pays can then recover from those earlier in the chain.

This structure created powerful, self-enforcing incentives. Every participant in the bill market staked their own money and reputation on every bill they touched. A merchant who endorsed a bill that later dishonored was liable for its full value. A bank that discounted bad paper absorbed the loss. An acceptance house that guaranteed a deadbeat was ruined. No one needed a regulator to tell them to evaluate counterparties carefully. Their own fortunes depended on it.

The result was a dense network of mutual surveillance and reputation. Merchants knew which buyers paid reliably and which did not. Banks knew which merchants could be trusted. Acceptance houses maintained intelligence networks spanning continents, tracking the creditworthiness of firms they might be asked to guarantee. A single dishonored bill could end a merchant's career, because no one would endorse his paper again. This was regulation through liability, not bureaucracy.

### Gold Settlement

At maturity, the bill must be paid. Under the classical gold standard, this meant settlement in gold, either directly or through instruments convertible to gold on demand.

For domestic transactions within a single country, settlement was straightforward. The holder presented the bill to the acceptor, who paid in gold coin, gold-backed banknotes, or a bank transfer representing a gold-convertible deposit. The holder could, if he wished, demand physical gold from the bank. Large settlements typically moved as ledger entries between banks rather than as physical metal, but the convertibility was always there, always enforceable.

International settlement was more elegant. Shipping gold across oceans was expensive: insurance, transport, interest lost during the voyage, and the risk of loss together cost roughly half a percent of the gold's value. Bills of exchange allowed trade to clear without moving metal.

When an English textile firm bought wool from Sydney, the Sydney merchant drew a bill on the English buyer, payable in London in pounds sterling. The merchant sold this bill to a Sydney bank at a discount, receiving Australian pounds immediately. The Sydney bank sent the bill to its London correspondent, who collected payment at maturity and credited the Sydney bank's London account. The Sydney bank now held a pound sterling balance in London.

But the Sydney bank operated in Australian pounds. It did not want to hold sterling indefinitely. Here the system's elegance emerged. English merchants were simultaneously buying Australian wheat, meat, and minerals. Australian importers were buying English manufactures. In each direction, exporters drew bills on importers. The Sydney bank could use its London sterling balance to purchase bills drawn on Australian buyers, payable in Sydney in Australian pounds. When those bills matured, the bank collected in its home currency.

In equilibrium, bills flowing in each direction roughly offset. Australian exports to England generated sterling claims in London. English exports to Australia generated Australian pound claims in Sydney. Banks in both cities exchanged these claims, and the trade balanced without gold ever crossing the ocean.

When trade persistently imbalanced, gold did flow, but the mere possibility of gold shipment kept exchange rates stable. If sterling weakened against Australian pounds beyond the cost of shipping gold (about half a percent), arbitrageurs would ship gold from London to Sydney, profiting from the exchange rate difference. This set boundaries, called gold points, within which exchange rates fluctuated. The threat of arbitrage kept rates stable without anyone needing to manage them.

The London bill market sat at the center of this global web. Sterling bills drawn on London financed trade between parties who never touched England: American cotton to German mills, Argentine beef to French tables, Indian tea to Russian samovars. London's position came not from empire but from the depth and reliability of its bill market, the concentration of acceptance houses and discount houses, and the confidence that a bill payable in London would be paid in gold.

### The Self-Liquidating Quality

A bill of exchange drawn on goods in transit possesses a quality that distinguishes it from other credit instruments: it liquidates itself. The wool shipped from Sydney will arrive in Manchester, be manufactured into textiles, sold to consumers, and generate the revenue to pay the bill. The bill's maturity matches the time required for this process. When the bill comes due, the goods have been sold, the money exists, and the payment happens.

This is why Adam Smith's Real Bills Doctrine held that banks discounting genuine commercial bills could not over-expand credit. A mortgage depends on the borrower's income for thirty years; if income falters, the loan sours. A government bond depends on future taxation; if the political will to tax wavers, the bond defaults. A bill drawn on wool already purchased by eager buyers depends only on the completion of a transaction already in progress. The credit creates itself when the goods ship and extinguishes itself when the goods sell. The total volume of bills in circulation expands and contracts automatically with the volume of goods moving to consumers.

### The Austrian Debate

The Austrian school remains divided on whether this system constituted sound money. Murray Rothbard, advocating one hundred percent gold reserves, argued that any credit not backed coin-for-coin by gold expanded the money supply and enabled the boom-bust cycle. When a bank discounts a bill, paying out gold or deposits for paper, it creates claims on gold exceeding the gold it holds. This, in Rothbard's view, was fractional reserve banking regardless of what backed the paper.

The opposing view, articulated most thoroughly by Antal Fekete, holds that Rothbard conflated clearing with money creation. A bill is not money. It is a credit instrument that matures into money and then ceases to exist. Money circulates indefinitely, but bills extinguish themselves. When a bank discounts a bill, it exchanges present gold for a claim on future gold. The bank's gold reserves fall, but they will be replenished in ninety days when the bill matures. This is not inflation but time preference made tradeable.

Fekete points to Carl Menger's 1909 encyclopedia entry on money, which states that commercial bank assets properly consist mostly of bills maturing daily, with only a minor fraction in gold coin. If the founder of Austrian economics accepted real bills as legitimate bank assets, perhaps Rothbard's one hundred percent standard represents a departure from, not a return to, sound money principles.

We cannot definitively resolve this debate because the system was never permitted to operate without government interference after the early twentieth century. What we can observe is that the bill system functioned for seven centuries, financed the Industrial Revolution, and collapsed only when governments intervened to monopolize money creation. The argument concerns what would happen under a pure gold standard with free banking. That experiment was never run.

### The Destruction

In August 1914, the bill market seized within days. War between the great powers meant debtors across Europe could not ship gold or draw new bills. Acceptance houses demanded payment from buyers who could not pay. The London Stock Exchange closed for five months. The British government suspended gold convertibility, issued paper currency without gold backing, and never fully restored the pre-war system. After the war, governments attempted to reconstruct a gold standard without the bill market that had made it elastic. The result was the deflation, instability, and eventual collapse of the 1930s.

The Federal Reserve, created in 1913, was explicitly designed to discount real bills for member banks. Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act authorized discounting "notes, drafts, and bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial transactions." But the Fed corrupted the doctrine, discounting government securities and speculative paper alongside genuine commercial bills. What Adam Smith described as a natural limit on credit expansion became, in government hands, a justification for unlimited expansion.

Today, bills of exchange survive in niche applications, overshadowed by letters of credit and bank-intermediated finance. The elasticity once provided by self-liquidating commercial paper is now provided by central bank money creation, with all the distortions that implies. We have replaced a decentralized system backed by goods, enforced by mutual liability, and settled in gold, with a centralized system backed by government promises, enforced by legal tender laws, and settled in whatever the central bank decides money is this week.

The market had already solved the problem of commercial credit. Governments unsolved it.

On the "Austrian Debate".

When we built nostr:npub1eajvs8x67vmzsnwaf9ltfgt59e6acmeztx9shduewvfgwftx8ahsagcd93 the development mechanics clearly confirmed the position of Antal Fekete and Juan Rallo.

It became very clear that Murray Rothbard and Phillip Bagus misunderstood the act of credit creation.

It is not the banks, cuckoos squeezing in as legal intermediaries, but the original buyer and seller granting terms which create raw credit money. Still not fungible, but already negotiable.

The merchant banks accepting a bill and discount houses discounting it, both are just enhancing but not creating the original credit, as Rothbard described it.

In 2026 nostr:npub1eajvs8x67vmzsnwaf9ltfgt59e6acmeztx9shduewvfgwftx8ahsagcd93 will bring back the private peer-to-peer payment instrument formerly known as "bill of exchange".

The e-bill returns with Freedom Technology, payable on unstoppable Bitcoin rails instead of in bank custodied gold, on encrypted Nostr transport instead of state postal services.

This will unlock world trade for the Bitcoin circular economy and give Bitcoin its missing currency, its Medium of Exchange.

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Cyberspace infrastructure can be eternal if rigorously designed to eliminate access points for meatspace coercion and violence.

#Bitcoin #Bitcredit

Christmas wishes from mass mailers are a perfect reminder to unsubscribe.

FUD. At even huge usage levels safe with a wide margin. 25 year evidence.

Bluetooth headsets even safer by many dimensions.

If you insist on being totally irrational and worried, just use a wired headset.

Both "more likely"?

Creative.

PS: Saylor's Bitcoin is more likely to go to his creditors.

I agree with your initial analysis.

Let's be conscious though of the difficulty of 'free market eating command' in money. Yes, it would work better for people and the prosperous free market economy.

But let's remember: The political caste was able to replace sound gold money with fiat. That danger is ever present.

And now we are starting as underdogs: we have the herculean challenge of starting up a #bitcoin based currency, its medium of exchange for trade and industry, while political money now has a big advantage in lower initial volatility and their power to impose societally harmful legislation if it is in the arrogant political caste's advantage.

Continued:

- Should we return to national currencies?

- How should we interpret the massive gold purchases made recently by central banks?

- Which countries are moving towards a more decentralised monetary system?

- How will our life look like long-term if each payment with CBDC money needs some kind of application with the central bank?

- Do EU citizens have any chance of  averting the centralisation of money and power with CBDC?

- Can we abolish the ECB?

- How to stop CBDCs, at least in the EU?

- Is it possible to create an independent, decentralised monetary system without the approval of lawmakers?

- Is it really just the banks underserving industry or is there a generational decline in German industry which reduces bank business?

- Wirtschaftsweise Werner von Sinn (Germany) says we have now after COVID much more new Money and Credit than what triggered the Financial Crisis of 2008/2009. Will this again result in a Big Crash and when?

- How much regulation is necessary to prevent misbehaviour of market participants?

/3 of 3

Continued:

Our subsequent Socratic Debate went on for many hours into the night, as always. Topics covered were:

- How long can a fiat system work and survive?

- How can we make sure that credit goes towards the productive businesses only?

- How can we increase productive credit? What incentives are organically available?

- Is there a precedent of a country that migrated from asset-based speculative credit and money creation to production based money creation?

- How does the Austrian school  consider the inflation impact of the three types of loans mentioned by Professor Werner, for (1) production, (2) consumption, (3) asset speculation?

- How do we solve the energy situation (price & quantity) in Europe if Russian relations and supply chains like Northstream are broken for at least a generation?

- Concerning Euro: will fiscal imbalances and asset bubbles precipitate a collapse of the Euro?

Read on.

/2 of 3

An impulse speech by Prof. Richard Werner opened yesterday's Socratic Debate at the Hayek Institute in Vienna 🇦🇹.

The “interest rates drive growth” theory is empirically wrong, he showed; rates follow growth, an 'Austrians' agree. Bank credit creation and its allocation decide whether economies boom or bust.

Prof. Werner warned that central banks, regulator-driven centralisation, and CBDCs will wipe out Europe’s local SME-lending banks (thousands already gone). The real path to prosperity is many small regional banks directing credit into productive investment, not speculation.

Our main point for debate was that Prof. Werner thinks that this can be fixed with the right policy prescription for central banks, whereas I think that the very institution of central banks and their enormous illegitime power will invariably lead to negative economic and political outcomes in time. Central banking and CBDCs are incompatible with free markets and a free society.

#Bitcoin shows that money (SoV) creation is a matter for the free market, and #Bitcredit aims to show the same for currency (MoE) creation.

Read on.

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Bitcoin will be more stable than fiat "stablecoins".

This panel has more than meets the eye.

Bringing the supply chains onto #Bitcoin is what will stabilise its exchange rate. Proper stable, non-inflationary.

Bitcoin won’t monetise on its own.

Trade credit is key, just like during the Gold Age.

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Thanks @The Bitcoin Conference for having me.

@BitcoinMagazine

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Money, Bitcoin: "stores value" by scarcity in relation to willing buyers and sellers and actual future production.

Currency, Bitcredit: "mediates exchange" of goods produced, represents the value against which it is created, purchasing power depends in actual future production.

In today’s “Bitcoin Bankers” Seminar in El Zonte we will talk about historic Wildcat Banking and novel digitalised Wildcat Minting will monetise Bitcoin for trade and industry adoption. Feel free to join us at 6pm on the upper deck of Olas Permanentes.

nhttps://www.satlantis.io/events/1222/Bitcoin-Bankers

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Today in el Zonte, after yesterday's Socratic seminar about full reserve banking, we will delve into the electronic bill of exchange on Bitcoin rails.

https://www.satlantis.io/events/1222/Bitcoin-Bankers