Avatar
Cyber Seagull
77953b3a63bcf1c748dbdeef109bd56de48c30edcd27d2092440c3adca31c975
Tiramisu. God. Bitcoin. Drivechain. In that order.
Replying to Avatar LogicallyMinded

nostr:npub1w72nkwnrhncuwjxmmmh3px74dhjgcv8de5nayzfygrp6mj33e96sumwyhg I’m curious if you have heard of this concern and if it had been addressed regarding #sidechains.

Replying to Avatar LogicallyMinded

nostr:npub1w72nkwnrhncuwjxmmmh3px74dhjgcv8de5nayzfygrp6mj33e96sumwyhg I’m curious if you have heard of this concern and if it had been addressed regarding #sidechains.

How ? How would a miner profit from a reorg ? Give an explicit scenerio.

(Yes, this has been answered many times)

Like calm down..... the major issue is hundreds of people using fresh unaudited binaries in security sensitive conditions, not that there might be 2+ networks. Free market competition is good. nostr:npub1m5s9w4t03znyetxswhgq0ud7fq8ef8y3l4kscn2e8wkvmv42hh3qujgjl3

There are currently multiple Haveno networks

Guest Post by my friend, nostr:npub1m5s9w4t03znyetxswhgq0ud7fq8ef8y3l4kscn2e8wkvmv42hh3qujgjl3

Quote:

At least 2 separate Haveno networks have launched as of today. One is called Reto and the other is called HardenedSteel. Those are the only ones I’m aware of right now, and things are happening pretty fast.

The haveno software was designed with the assumption that only a single network would be operated. People could fork it and run their own networks, but they wouldn’t interact directly at all. But it looks to me as of this moment this is not how it is going to play out.

The client has the network info hard coded. So to use more than one, you need two copies of the client. This means that for most people they have to pick one. And, users might not understand this, just google “haveno” and pull the first git repo they see. This has significant, fast moving and quickly ossifying network effects with big repercussions.

We need to be very vigilant right now, as we are about to witness the very swift rise of a major power broker in our community. We don’t want to start using a Haveno network run by scammers or authoritarians. Each network is it’s arbitrators, and soon, the merchants on each one.

I think it’s probably a good idea to figure out a way to connect to multiple networks, and to show listings with details about which network/arbitrator set a user is trusting when taking up a listing.

I’m cautiously optimistic, Monero has gotten rid of powerful people without a hitch before. But it is a bigger community now and that will be much harder to do. If we are vigilant during this time and we get through this successfully I think we become unbeatable, but the road directly ahead of us is treacherous, the next few days are going to move very fast.

Source:

https://monero.town/post/3138955

Mister_Monster's Nostr:

npub1m5s9w4t03znyetxswhgq0ud7fq8ef8y3l4kscn2e8wkvmv42hh3qujgjl3

HardenedSteal guy said he has halted worknon his

How can they get kicked out ? You as a user or even a mining operator do notnknow who to sensor. They can't use their Asics, but they can use a huge farm of regular cpu's.

Controlling entity would just censor the final settlement layer for lightning on which ecash mints is based.

Or the largest, most reliable, best fee rate mints are state subsidied.

Or both, simulatenously.

The state often runs operations to recover costs of the operation itself, and then rug pulls when it hurts the most or serves them.

Replying to Avatar LogicallyMinded

I agree that cost of attack for a state actor would be marginal but I don’t think those attacks could achieve much in the long run because there would be a reaction from the network either through upgrades and/or brining more hash power online. This would ultimately strengthen the network in the long run even if it can undermine the trust in it at first. Also, specifically on #Monero it would be challenging to selectively censor transactions. Double-spending would undermine trust in the network but wouldn’t achieve much. I guess empty blocks could be mined but for how long?

My point is that, I don’t think this type of attack is practical for a state actor to conduct. That’s also not how they proceed to attack blockchains. If a state actor were to be caught conducting this attack (through whistleblowers or other leaks), it would strongly undermine their credibility which is a key factor for states to maintain.

As we see, state actors prefer attacking those systems through regulations, weaponization of their agencies and propaganda.

Again, I’m not saying that such attacks are out of reach of state actors but until proven otherwise, it doesn’t appear that those are the most effective to conduct.

I’m curious what other are your thoughts on other Sybil resistance mechanisms such as PoS. Would you say that those tend to be more resistant to state actors? Which mechanism would you favor? There are more and more blockchains adopting hybrid PoW/PoS models.

This is a good reply, finally, i've been asking around for days.

The main counter you have made here is something like: "Undermining Monero is possible, but would not achieve much, or would only do so for a short time before a solution would be deployed."

If it is possible and it does undermine Monero, then the goal (much) was achieved. We are talking about something they perceive to be, by the point they do this, an existential risk, perhaps on the level of a Hitler or Communist Russia. Think about that, and the war of attrition they would fight.

Knocking the price down 100$ in confidence in monetary terms would be the war equivalent of an air raid bombing on an enemies industrial sector.

Two huge assumptions are embedded in your scenario where we know an attack is taking place, that is, we have somehow confirmed that a state controls majority hash, and is fucking with tx's;

1. That a solution will and

1.2 can be implemented, and

2. that the price and project will recover.

The second strikes me as the "manifest destiny" level of confidence Bitcoin toxics have and the first is just as hopefull. While i agree that in general attacks can make a project stronger, this one anonymous hash providers, might not.

Advocating for or defending Monero at that point would be given no quarter or discussion. They would frame privacy coins as dangerous to a much higher level than even now.

Think of prohibition where they poisoned and allowed the sale of Alchohol, that in turn killed tons of people. There is no law so petty the state will not kill you over it. The state has and can do almost anything, credibility is established at the barrel end of a gun. No one would care if they run over your pet coin. They'll just say you are all drug dealers or something.

Another part of your repky relies on something others have said to me, a reliance on their past actions and behavior towards crypto. Seizing funds, legal games, regulations, ect. This still does not answer the question : How do we know hash is not captured/coordinated by the major pools right now ?

As far as attacks go, it's true, targeted censorship is not possible, but random censorship is. In addition to the other methods you mention, are all now tools they could use to undermine confidence in the network, if they did have hash dominance, and for cheap !

Not only that, this could be used in such a way and in a manner combined with an astroturf campaign to divert attention away from what is actually happening. For example, posting comments and starting rumors about it being a type of encryption or CT ring break or bug none of the devs can find, but it's actually just them controlling the hash the entire time.

As far as solutions, i like Nano's (xno) removal of fees and mining entirely and their special version of POS which is not a POS at all because nothing is staked, and is more akin to congressional voting, wherein how much weight a representative has is known to all and can be rebalanced if it gets too concentrated. But the reps, could still all be the same entity.

I need to study it more and of course it's core design is only pseudonymous like Bitcoi with no community ambition for privacy, which sucks but a fork of nano is working on Camo, a privacy tool like coinjoin.

Another is of course Worldcoin, with intrusive KYC and centralized development, so not really a solution.

Ultimately i don't think there is an obvious solution. What i'm describing is not a Sybil attack, i'm not saying they use bots or overwhelm the network with fake users.

There not being a readily obvious solution, does not remove the potential problem though.

POW or POS both just push the "Who watches the Watcher" problem up a level.

Oh. I'm not defending ASIC's as a more resilient structure, just that CPU's are not either.

Yes the community could respond, but you have once again ignored my question and other Monerans do this too. I'm not being mean here, just pointing out a common short circuit in logic:

How would you even know ?

For all we know the hash at this moment relies on several pools that appear to be decentralized, but are actually the same actor.

I want you to try this:

-Estimate how many Xmr users there are, -Double that to = x

-Now give each of them four cpu's, yhe cost of which is = y

-Make the cost of running 4 cpu's per year = z

- (x y z) = R

Now i want you to compare R with it's nearest comparable governmental agency or department or commitee. If it's too small for federal agencies, bring it to the state level.

- Let's = that to D.

When you have that i want you to read the following sentence outloud and tell me if you believe it, example:

The united states government is incapable of running a server farm with a cost of R which is comparable to the yearly budget of D, the Idaho potato Tourism department.

Intersting trivia: Whirlpool's code is shorter than Bitcoins code, and that dude is going to jail...so....

And the answer would be: no

Sufficient trust in a mint would be centralization. This applies even to trust in several large mints.

I agree with your second point and Monerans have been avoiding my query on this, but i disagree with your first point about frequent hard forks. It's "how" it's done that is important, not how often. The HF's that take place are years in the making, focused on improving the single value proposition for XMR. They go through rigourous testing by skilled devs. The community can reject it, but rarely do because, and it bares repeating, they only have one goal. Privacy. No ETF's or corporate/state actors to appease, no mining conglomerates or electricity infra, no layer 2 scaling or smart contracts to integrate, no ordinals or Script externalities like BitVm.

This means only a handful of experts need to work on a given fork, itself trying to fix a potential problem, push the fix and move on with their lives, like with RandomX. Whereas with other projects you need to pass on the torch, audit Interoperability, and consult with veterans and stake holders.

Scheduled Hard forks in Monero are way less dramatic than in politics based Bitcoin and even less than in centralized upgrades like Windows going from one version to another.

Monero is so simple, it eliminates entire classes of issues that would make frequent hard forks "scary", whereas Bitcoin preserves old problems to keep legacy devs employed.

So does Bitcoin. If Quantum Computing breaks SHA-256, Bitcoins security model relies on devs switching to a post quantum algo.

Maitenance hard/soft-forks are not a feature unique to Monero development. What is unique is its hyperfocus and singular mission towards default privacy. Bitcoin has inconsistent narratives, memes and aspirations (NgU, MoE, Sov, is it for privacy or not, is it compliant or libertarian) all well and good in terms of competition in pure market terms, but the history of large unfocused projects and nations is not favorable. Small, lean and focused teams can win against giants, especially during a crisis the elephant too entrenched to respond to.

But hey, who knows, maybe one more fucking addressing scheme is what Bitcoin needs.