Replying to Avatar LogicallyMinded

I agree that cost of attack for a state actor would be marginal but I don’t think those attacks could achieve much in the long run because there would be a reaction from the network either through upgrades and/or brining more hash power online. This would ultimately strengthen the network in the long run even if it can undermine the trust in it at first. Also, specifically on #Monero it would be challenging to selectively censor transactions. Double-spending would undermine trust in the network but wouldn’t achieve much. I guess empty blocks could be mined but for how long?

My point is that, I don’t think this type of attack is practical for a state actor to conduct. That’s also not how they proceed to attack blockchains. If a state actor were to be caught conducting this attack (through whistleblowers or other leaks), it would strongly undermine their credibility which is a key factor for states to maintain.

As we see, state actors prefer attacking those systems through regulations, weaponization of their agencies and propaganda.

Again, I’m not saying that such attacks are out of reach of state actors but until proven otherwise, it doesn’t appear that those are the most effective to conduct.

I’m curious what other are your thoughts on other Sybil resistance mechanisms such as PoS. Would you say that those tend to be more resistant to state actors? Which mechanism would you favor? There are more and more blockchains adopting hybrid PoW/PoS models.

This is a good reply, finally, i've been asking around for days.

The main counter you have made here is something like: "Undermining Monero is possible, but would not achieve much, or would only do so for a short time before a solution would be deployed."

If it is possible and it does undermine Monero, then the goal (much) was achieved. We are talking about something they perceive to be, by the point they do this, an existential risk, perhaps on the level of a Hitler or Communist Russia. Think about that, and the war of attrition they would fight.

Knocking the price down 100$ in confidence in monetary terms would be the war equivalent of an air raid bombing on an enemies industrial sector.

Two huge assumptions are embedded in your scenario where we know an attack is taking place, that is, we have somehow confirmed that a state controls majority hash, and is fucking with tx's;

1. That a solution will and

1.2 can be implemented, and

2. that the price and project will recover.

The second strikes me as the "manifest destiny" level of confidence Bitcoin toxics have and the first is just as hopefull. While i agree that in general attacks can make a project stronger, this one anonymous hash providers, might not.

Advocating for or defending Monero at that point would be given no quarter or discussion. They would frame privacy coins as dangerous to a much higher level than even now.

Think of prohibition where they poisoned and allowed the sale of Alchohol, that in turn killed tons of people. There is no law so petty the state will not kill you over it. The state has and can do almost anything, credibility is established at the barrel end of a gun. No one would care if they run over your pet coin. They'll just say you are all drug dealers or something.

Another part of your repky relies on something others have said to me, a reliance on their past actions and behavior towards crypto. Seizing funds, legal games, regulations, ect. This still does not answer the question : How do we know hash is not captured/coordinated by the major pools right now ?

As far as attacks go, it's true, targeted censorship is not possible, but random censorship is. In addition to the other methods you mention, are all now tools they could use to undermine confidence in the network, if they did have hash dominance, and for cheap !

Not only that, this could be used in such a way and in a manner combined with an astroturf campaign to divert attention away from what is actually happening. For example, posting comments and starting rumors about it being a type of encryption or CT ring break or bug none of the devs can find, but it's actually just them controlling the hash the entire time.

As far as solutions, i like Nano's (xno) removal of fees and mining entirely and their special version of POS which is not a POS at all because nothing is staked, and is more akin to congressional voting, wherein how much weight a representative has is known to all and can be rebalanced if it gets too concentrated. But the reps, could still all be the same entity.

I need to study it more and of course it's core design is only pseudonymous like Bitcoi with no community ambition for privacy, which sucks but a fork of nano is working on Camo, a privacy tool like coinjoin.

Another is of course Worldcoin, with intrusive KYC and centralized development, so not really a solution.

Ultimately i don't think there is an obvious solution. What i'm describing is not a Sybil attack, i'm not saying they use bots or overwhelm the network with fake users.

There not being a readily obvious solution, does not remove the potential problem though.

POW or POS both just push the "Who watches the Watcher" problem up a level.

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I don’t disagree with your analysis, I just don’t think it’s a given that this type of attack will be successful at killing the network in the hypothesis that there would be conducted one day. I guess the best way to protect one’s #crypto capital is to diversify it across various chains as it’s unlikely that an actor would attack all chains at the same time. I’ll have to look more into #Nano although I’ve heard that the design was flawed and potentially not secured.

For proof-of-personhood #blockchain like #Worldcoin (but more decentralized) check out #Idena and #Humanode.

Also hybrid POS/POW blockchains like #eCash may be harder to attack as you would need both majority hashpower and stake.

Controlling entity would just censor the final settlement layer for lightning on which ecash mints is based.

Or the largest, most reliable, best fee rate mints are state subsidied.

Or both, simulatenously.

The state often runs operations to recover costs of the operation itself, and then rug pulls when it hurts the most or serves them.

Nano instant and feeless transactions are pretty cool and DAGs seem very scalable. One thing that sucks is that only 33% of the network is required to halt/censor everyone elses transactions iirc

It also requires user to actively vote for their representative to secure the network, so brings in all the problems of voting in general (weak incentives/voter apathy)

The main problem is that it's not supported by many gateways.

I doubt that feeless DAG design are really secured. For instance, #IOTA had failed to make any significant progress on to their vision years after the launch. If there was a similar model out there that works they probably would have replicated it by then.

Definitely less secure overall I think