If you transact purely in monero, then monero is better privacy than bitcoin+coinjoin. Nobody is gonna argue against that.
Now if you are suggesting taking your non-private bitcoin and swapping it into monero and then back into bitcoin instead of using bitcoin+coinjoin It does look like bitcoin-monero non-custodial cross-chain atomic swaps are possible, but I've not used it.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1126.pdf
But can't really compare. The ring signatures in Monero are all enforced and participants are not required to be online and coordinated. Also there is no real concept of a post mix where the anon set reduces periodically for a transaction as every tx has CT and several mixins
Where is #[2]
To talk about % of dojo that ran by Samourai vs your own node. Bull shit argument
What about ledger live do they know peoples xpub? Or cold card that asks to use Electrum wallet with public backend servers to index balances. do those public electum servers know thier xpub?
First of all SW coordinator is blinded run over tor so even if Samourai can track xpubs they don’t know entities ip and even if they do they have no idea about what happens post mix txns.
For equal outputs to exist there will be change and coordinator is blinded (soon decentralized) It doesn't know the links between a coinjoin's inputs and outputs. That was one of the major goals of the zerolink framework. Also doxxic change is completely unaffected by mixes since it has never been mixed.
Every SW user knows exactly what to do with that doxxic change so there is no combining with other doxxic change that didn’t come from the same source.
The Tx0 makes all your UTXO's share a tx hash, which prevents them from mixing with each other, preventing an "accidental" Sybil attack from entering a large amount of BTC, Samourai separates the coordinator fee in the Tx0 no fee flagging in the fee addresses. Every communication between Alice and the coordinator is made with a different Tor identity. It's transparent for the coordinator if one of the messages is actually sent by Bob, so when Alice sends her clear output to the coordinator it's made with a Tor identity different from the Tor identity used to submit the input and the blinded ouput. Who is using this Tor identity is transparent for the coordinator. It’s two separate Tor identities. This was even in the original zerolink docs IIRC.
So once coins are mixed, they are segregated and can't "accidentally" make their way back to unmixed section of wallet. You have to manually generate a receive address and send from postmix to get utxos back there, which obviously you shouldn't do. This is the only way to have true ZeroLink, where a user can't spend mixed and unmixed together. SW doing ZeroLink original spec, whihc is simultaneous denominated pools, max entropy mixes for the number of inputs/outputs, never 2 or more same previous tx in a same mix, and unequal amount coinjoined spends post-mix if the user chooses.
There is no equivalent to SW and your #[3] argument about who is using sw dojo vs their own dojo has no weight and not valid at all. I read on twitter
Your claim that Wasabi has no equal outputs is just plain false. Anyone can look at the transactions on the blockchain themselves to see you are lying to them: https://mempool.space/tx/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b
There are...
7 equal outputs for 20.00000000 BTC
3 equal outputs for 10.73741824 BTC
25 equal outputs for 1.34217728 BTC
6 equal outputs for 0.67108864 BTC
8 equal outputs for 0.43046721 BTC
6 equal outputs for 0.28697814 BTC
6 equal outputs for 0.20000000 BTC
11 equal outputs for 0.14348907 BTC
6 equal outputs for 0.10000000 BTC
8 equal outputs for 0.05000000 BTC
17 equal outputs for 0.03188646 BTC
14 equal outputs for 0.02097152 BTC
7 equal outputs for 0.01594323 BTC
6 equal outputs for 0.01062882 BTC
11 equal outputs for 0.00531441 BTC
12 equal outputs for 0.00354294 BTC
13 equal outputs for 0.00262144 BTC
6 equal outputs for 0.00200000 BTC
11 equal outputs for 0.00118098 BTC
13 equal outputs for 0.00100000 BTC
7 equal outputs for 0.00065536 BTC
9 equal outputs for 0.00039366 BTC
7 equal outputs for 0.00032768 BTC
25 equal outputs for 0.00020000 BTC
4 equal outputs for 0.00016384 BTC
10 equal outputs for 0.00013122 BTC
12 equal outputs for 0.00010000 BTC
5 equal outputs for 0.00008192 BTC
15 equal outputs for 0.00006561 BTC
12 equal outputs for 0.00005000 BTC
And most importantly, there is NO TRACEABLE CHANGE in Wasabi, unlike Whirlpool transactions which can always be unpeeled to reveal a 100% deterministic link to the change created from the tx0.
https://kycp.org/#/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b
If I look at your txns there is 236 possible output merges and 298 input merges
finally there is no address reuse in wasabi
vs
this tx is Samourai tx which coinjoin looks untraceable?
https://kycp.org/#/cb0827eeed92d38e12ae2a99e7d8a3fed794329e6918f990b0fdfb36afeace29
If wasabi is zerolink then why there is no equal outputs as outlined in the zerolink protocol? No postmix tools after the fact. No segregation of accounts. Do you even know why there is doxxic change? For equal outputs to exist there will be change and coordinator is blinded (soon decentralized) It doesn't know the links between a coinjoin's inputs and outputs. That was one of the major goals of the zerolink framework, that nopara wrote but ironically Wasabi doesn't do equal input and output "zerolink" mixes so they are not equivalent. doxxic change is completely unaffected by mixes since it has never been mixed. Every SW user knows exactly what to do with that doxxic change so there is no combining with other doxxic change that didn’t come from the same source.
The Tx0 makes all your UTXO's share a tx hash, which prevents them from mixing with each other, preventing an "accidental" Sybil attack from entering a large amount of BTC, Samourai separates the coordinator fee in the Tx0 no fee flagging in the fee addresses. Every communication between Alice and the coordinator is made with a different Tor identity. It's transparent for the coordinator if one of the messages is actually sent by Bob, so when Alice sends her clear output to the coordinator it's made with a Tor identity different from the Tor identity used to submit the input and the blinded ouput. Who is using this Tor identity is transparent for the coordinator. It’s two separate Tor identities. This was even in the original zerolink docs IIRC.
So once coins are mixed, they are segregated and can't "accidentally" make their way back to unmixed section of wallet. You have to manually generate a receive address and send from postmix to get utxos back there, which obviously you shouldn't do. This is the only way to have true ZeroLink, where a user can't spend mixed and unmixed together. SW doing ZeroLink original spec. Simultaneous denominated pools, max entropy mixes for the number of inputs/outputs, never 2 or more same previous tx in a same mix, and unequal amount coinjoined spends post-mix if the user chooses.
Here is an impartial opinion
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-December/017542.html
They are some good stuff in wasabi like


But they've completely missed the use of entropy to establish deterministic links.
More worryingly they've not realised that address re-use is endemic in Wasabi which undermines mixes. In fact, the only address re-use they've mentioned is when it has occurred in Tx0s on Whirlpool.
They also don't seem to have grokked that zerolink had account segregation which Wasabi never implemented.
Anyway everything is written in code here
https://code.samourai.io/whirlpool/Whirlpool/-/blob/whirlpool/THEORY.md
Ironically nopara wrote zerolink but it’s not implemented in wasabi, because they don't have equal outputs as outlined in the zerolink protocol. No postmix tools like in SW.
No, Samourai wins because it doesn’t need to lie!
https://twitter.com/SamouraiWallet/status/1504489920827645959
The major difference between whirlpool and wasabi is that wasabi is not zerolink and whirlpool is 100% entropy, so many of the issues with wasabi's mix composition do not apply to whirlpool.
Wasabi made little effort to stop a user from spending the unmixed change with their mixed outputs. In fact it encouraged this with a "select all" button that spends the entirety of the wallet balance, mixed and unmixed in the same tx, which undoes all the mixing. Unmixed change can also reduce user anonymity sets (toxic recall attack) and de-anonymize users without any user feedback.
Dealing with the different mixed TXO amounts is a nightmare, which is why wasabi purposefully made their coin selection deterministic (predictable), which negates the effects of remixing.
Wasabi also has an address reuse problem. Which comes in various flavors, my favorite of which is the kind where a mixed TXO and unmixed TXO are paid to the same address, which automatically de-anonymizes the user. See YouTube video for explainer.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=alcLdBsoDDg
De-anonymizing users with the above issues does not require "compromised XPUBs", which seems to be the only gripe by The Kliq against Samourai.
Whirlpool, being 100% entropy, does not have the problems discussed above.
#[3]
No, Udi is arrogant individual who thinks he is the pope of the world and his opinion matters but in reality he is just another homo sapient whose brain is no different than yours or mine.
Do you even understand bitcoin or just pretend you do?
If you still use wasabi it means you don’t understand zerolink protocol period!
are you going to comply of course you will just like you comply to KYC/AML
The major difference between whirlpool and wasabi is that wasabi is not zerolink and whirlpool is 100% entropy, so many of the issues with wasabi's mix composition do not apply to whirlpool.
Wasabi made little effort to stop a user from spending the unmixed change with their mixed outputs. In fact it encouraged this with a "select all" button that spends the entirety of the wallet balance, mixed and unmixed in the same tx, which undoes all the mixing. Unmixed change can also reduce user anonymity sets (toxic recall attack) and de-anonymize users without any user feedback.
Dealing with the different mixed TXO amounts is a nightmare, which is why wasabi purposefully made their coin selection deterministic (predictable), which negates the effects of remixing.
Wasabi also has an address reuse problem. Which comes in various flavors, my favorite of which is the kind where a mixed TXO and unmixed TXO are paid to the same address, which automatically de-anonymizes the user. See YouTube video for explainer.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=alcLdBsoDDg
De-anonymizing users with the above issues does not require "compromised XPUBs", which seems to be the only gripe by The Kliq against Samourai.
Whirlpool, being 100% entropy, does not have the problems discussed above.
And who decided that those countries are evil? Is the Evilist of them all USA itself. what is this country God of the world does everything it wants and dictates what it wants. Are you all just going to bow down to a bully of the earth. There is no lightning without on chain tx so are you just going to say that for those tx also . Go suck your own schlung. We don’t live in a unipolar world anymore it’s over.
Explain to them that unlike mastodon, a nostr relay is a bucket of messages, nostr relay just stores messages/events. Nostr is not a network where relays send all events to eachother, they only store what is given to them directly.
But unlike Mastodon where user identities are attached to servers and servers have a degree of control over registered users, Nostr is a lot more open in that regard. There are two components at play on Nostr: clients and relays. Each user runs a client, while anyone can run a relay. Clients can publish data (create posts) on any number of relays and fetch data from other relays.
Each user is assigned a public key. When a user follows someone, the user’s client fetches posts associated with that someone’s public key from the associated relay. This process is repeated on start-up, with the client querying data from all relays it knows for all users it follows. The fetched data is then displayed to the user chronologically to make up a feed.
such an implementation solves several flaws that other platforms suffer from. On Mastodon, when a server shuts down, your data and account are completely deleted. However, on Nostr, since users are identifiable by public keys and are not really tied to relays (servers) if a relay shuts down or gets deleted, they can always move to another relay. This benefits censorship-resistantce, If a user gets banned from a relay, they can publish posts to another.


