This is such a left curve take on the real problem that is pool centralization.
This is why DATUM and nostr:nprofile1qqsq9k04vahllseell55m74n3047y88pzlr0z5yany32st29fapqmgspz4mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduhsz9thwden5te0dehhxarj9ehhsarj9ejx2a30qrcyul are the most important projects in Bitcoin. Pools who control the blocks are an enormous liability, although this attack isn’t perfectly straightforward due to the shitcoin incentive.
Discussion
The problem with pool centralization is pools controlling the blocks and miners all essentially being blind "light clients" instead of full nodes.
Sure, but why do the pools centralize?
Because no one wants to float the capital required to sustain an FPPS payout structure, which the vast majority of hashers demand.
This is a problem of incentives not protocols.
A potential solution to the problem: spin up an FPPS pool that sells Bitcoin bonds to raise capital to float the variance risk then pay your bonds out with a fraction of the puny margins that mining pools operate on. Until then Ocean et al are just LARPing. I support their ability to LARPing, but there should be no illusions that they’re attacking pool centralization.
Pools centralizing isn't the problem. Polls controlling what the miners mine, *since* they centralize, is the far more concerning issue.
In other words, if a pool couldn't attack the network even if they have 60% of the hash power, then the existence of the pool isn't that big of a deal. This is the point of DATUM.
This is a feature that very few hashers are seeking, as it increases the complexity of running a mining operation.
The only incentive for hashers to take on the task of block construction is altruism at a very low time preference.
The only way to really get this resolved would be to make it super easy at the firmware level of the ASIC server, and that would pose a non-trivial overhaul of mining architecture.
What’s being proposed is all increase in overhead with minimal payback on a reasonable time frame, let’s say 5 years.