Well shoot, the more difficult you make it for an attacker to get your btc, the more complexity it adds to securing your btc. Now you have the pin to protect, the seedphrase to protect, the passphase to protect, so another seedphrase to protect, and of course the device itself to protect. Maybe i need to re-think the whole opsec thing. I prefer simplicity.
Discussion
Tradeoffs
Here's what I might, possibly, hypothetically do. Only store the pin in my head, so it can't possibly be compromised.
Store seed phrase in 2-3 safe locations off-site. I also keep a spare, unused hardware device off-site. If something happens to me, my wife would be instructed to retrieve seed phrase and spare device, and restore from seed. If I forget my pin, restore from seed. If device gets stolen, restore from seed and transfer.
Simple-ish.
That sounds like a not too complicated plan.