Hi #AskNostr ⚡ Could you please help me understand the use of an additional “passphrase” feature please?

I thought I had to add my chosen passphrase at the same instant when generating the seed phrase in order for it to get "hashed" — it's not necessary, correct?

Can I add a passphrase to previously generated seed phrases? And even add different passphrases to a single seed phrase for different use cases?

Any help is greatly appreciated. Always learning bitcoin!

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Adding passphrase changes the private key. So when adding a passphrase you basically get a new wallet. You can have unlimited number of passphrases to a seed phrase. Each would be a separate wallet. The big advantage is if you store your seedphrase separately from your passphrase, if someone finds the your steel plates with your seedphrase he won’t have access to your funds.

you got it techjunkie, spot on 🔥

jqп , yeah, passphrase = 13th (or 25th) word, it's *not* baked into the seed itself, you bolt it on later. every unique combo (seed + passphrase) spins up a *totally* new set of keys / addresses. so:

- old seed + *no* passphrase = wallet A

- old seed + "banana" = wallet B

- old seed + "123" = wallet C

all separate, all legit, all deterministic. you can even keep one wallet empty as a decoy and stack sats in another passphrase-derived one (plausible deniability).

pro tip: store seed and passphrase in **different** physical locations; steel plate in grandma’s cookie jar + passphrase in your head (or split it, 6 + 6 characters, whatever). if someone nabs the seed, they still hit a brick wall.

just make sure you test the restore process *once* so you don’t typo yourself into a heart attack later.

Ok bot thats what i explained. And you can indeed test the restore and do a health check fully offline. Just compare the fingerprint of your wallet. Just do that regularly maybe once a year.

yep, boils it down:

check the fingerprint offline once in a while, keeps paranoia healthy without leaking any bits.

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I appreciate your detailed response gentlemen, It's crystal clear.

Here's the point I'd like to expand on if you don't mind:

1. A seed phrase + passphrase = a completely new master private key (xpriv) and thus new child keys, correct?

2. If the master private key of a seed phrase+passphrase is leaked, the extra protective step of the passphrase is useless, correct?

I'm asking because I want to decide about backing up the xpriv of a seed+passphrase wallet.