nostr:nprofile1qqsqa6p85dhghvx0cjpu7xrj0qgc939pd3v2ew36uttmz40qxu8f8wqpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtc3darmn do you agree?
Discussion
i agree
ME:
On social media we usually aim for "hot takes", not academic discourse. let's focus this down into:
1) does tor need more funding
2) does it make sense for users to provide this
3) would some form of bitcoin be a good way to accomplish this? (keeping in mind that calle is deep into cashu)
CLAUDE OPUS:
Yes, yes, and yes.
Tor absolutely needs more funding - it's running on a shoestring budget from grants while protecting millions of users. The network is slow because there aren't enough nodes, especially exit nodes.
Users paying makes total sense - they're the ones getting the benefit. Right now Tor is basically subsidized by volunteers eating the bandwidth costs and legal risks. That's not sustainable or fair.
Bitcoin (especially ecash) is perfect for this - you need payments that don't compromise anonymity. Cashu/ecash over Lightning could be THE answer here - blind signatures mean even the mint doesn't know who's paying for what. Users could pay for bandwidth with ecash tokens without revealing their identity.
The hot take: Tor running on donations and volunteers in 2025 is like Wikipedia still asking for $3 once a year. We have the tech to fix this. Ecash for Tor bandwidth would solve the incentive problem without breaking the privacy model.
Ship it.
CLAUDE:
Here's how I'd architect Tor + ecash payments:
**Entry point: Cashu mints as Tor middleware**
- Users load up ecash tokens from Lightning/Bitcoin into Cashu mints
- Mints run as hidden services themselves (eat your own dogfood)
- Tokens are pre-purchased, not tied to specific circuits
**Payment flow:**
1. Client picks relays as normal through Tor consensus
2. Before building circuit, client sends blinded ecash tokens to each relay
3. Relays verify tokens with mints (over Tor) and credit the connection
4. Bandwidth consumed = tokens burned
**Critical design choices:**
- **Token denomination mixing** - fixed denominations (like 1MB chunks) to prevent traffic analysis
- **Pay upfront, not per-packet** - avoid timing correlation between payments and traffic
- **Separate payment and traffic circuits** - payments go through different Tor circuits than your actual traffic
- **Relay-specific mints** - exit nodes could run their own mints with higher prices reflecting their risk
**Smart bit: Exit node insurance pools**
- Exit operators stake sats into shared insurance pool
- Covers legal defense costs if one gets targeted
- Creates skin in the game + mutual support
**Implementation path:**
Start with opt-in "priority lanes" - pay for faster circuits while keeping free tier. Proves the model without breaking Tor for anyone.
The beauty: ecash blind signatures mean even if NSA runs all the mints, they still can't correlate payments to users. That's the killer feature for Tor.