I think trusting a third party server is a joke. It's not hard to verify an address from the source and avoid any clipboard malware.
Discussion
Don’t think you need a screen on the hardware (or the “server as a screen” option) to check for clipboard malware - you can catch that on the device you’re doing the copying on
I personally like the screen on the HW because I can verify an address there, offline, and sign it before sending it back online to post. Once the correct address is signed there is no way to change it, so I know the transaction is correct. Without the screen I won't be able to check it until it's back on a device with a screen that is probably online.
What do you usually compare it against? Curious both about what type of device you’re using with your hardware wallet and what specifically you’re usually comparing the wallet screen to
I was using a ledger, but I just moved my coins off that to my phone's bluewallet. I compare the address on the screen to the address in the bluewallet app. I have a passport on the way, which actually bypasses the entire clipboard issue by allowing you to scan QR codes.
Not 100% sure I understand your setup, but seems like probably one of these:
If it’s bluewallet on your phone plus Ledger: If your phone is sufficiently compromised, you can’t trust the address shown in bluewallet, or the QR code you’re scanning..
If it’s desktop plus bluewallet on your phone: if your desktop is sufficiently compromised, you can’t trust the address there, or a QR code scanned from there…
I don't think blue wallet itself can become compromised unless blue wallet pushes an update through the app store themselves. If they did and I was given fake addresses in the app then no amount of checking the address, whether server or on a screen, is going to catch it.