The problem I have with economists talking in terms of "distortions" as a criticism of government-intervention in the economy, is it presupposes the existence of an ideal state of nature. Usually, there's no attempt to describe the basis for this ideal state of nature, other than it's just assumed to be there, emanating from metaphysical claims about natural laws.
The argument then becomes that *all* government interventions are ipso facto a negative distortion that takes you further away from the ideal equilibrium that would emerge if not for the interference of the government.
The problem is, there's absolutely no empirical reason to believe this moral maxima is just floating out there, being distorted away by the existence of states, taxes or even forms of money. My favorite whipping boy, Rothbard, actually kind of realized this, and it's why he detested empiricism so much and disliked both Popper and Hume. Because their philosophical arguments undermined this metaphysical claim, which he believed could be proven to exist through pure reason.
While Rothbard and his contemporary, Hoppe both acknowledge Hume's is-ought dilemma, which is actually quite apropos here -- their routing around it with praxeology and wits Hoppe's "argumentation ethics" is wholly unconvincing and I would argue is borderline intellectual woo woo.