Some Thoughts on the TikTok Ban And Liberal Democracy. https://medium.com/@mike.brock/some-thoughts-on-the-tiktok-ban-and-liberal-democracy-ed6b4ce70fd6
So once again, you're just so certain this world of yours will be so much more just and market forces will deliver just outcomes. You're so sure, you just shrug and say these regressions I bring up are not worth thinking about. Neat!
The concept you're referring to is known as "prior restraint".
In an anarcho-capitalist future, what exactly does the poor person appeal to when the billionaire doesn't honor their commitment? What if that billionaire owns the private court for dispute resolution? The obvious problems with this extreme property maximalist view are quite simply not that hard to think about. You're just asserting moral prefepts, and acting with indignance that anyone could disagree.
An economic dominance can never be a form of authoritarianism, because you believe property rights are the highest moral good. Yes, I know all your arguments. And I'll just say, you've just treated my entire critique as irrelevant, because you're so certain of the objective correctness of your views based on a priori reasoning.
I mean, right-libertarians just act as if their first principles ethical stances are self-evidently true. And concerns about things like the problem of collective action are irrelevant. Even more bizarre, is they assume that everyone is going to eventually agree with them and have a moral awakening where they realize "taxation is theft" and therefore we have to get rid of the welfare state.
Basically you're just saying the anarcho-capitalist argument is objectively objectively morally correct. All matters of distribution are just irrelevant because property rights must be absolute. Any claim on the public good is authoritarian. Naturally, I think this stance is both unconvincing and smug.
You haven't really addressed anything I've said here, so not such how to respond. You've merely just restated the case I'm criticizing and not attending to my arguments at all.
I actually got distracted and didn't proof read that. Here is an edited version of what I just said for clairty:
I never said that Davidson and Rees-Mogg advance the praxeological justification. I said the best attempts to justify that kind of thinking do. In fact, that the Sovereign Individual is silent on its normative foundations, and simply tracks a technological determinist argument — that to your point, the incentives leading intractably towards a certain outcome — is the entire basis for my charge of epistemic authoritarianism.
An example of what I’m saying would be the notion that say “the welfare state won’t be possible, even if people want it” in the future that is an intractible logical consequence of the incentive structures. That’s an implicit normative constraint that takes arguments about a common good that isn’t merely a feature of revealed market preferences off the table. Which, I say betrays a very extreme right-libertarian view at the bottom of the whole thesis.
So I apologize if I wasn’t clear enough in the following paragraph to separate the critique of the argument from the praxeological argument for the normative foundations of such a view. But I’d argue, if anything, I am trying to bring my critique against the strongest form of the argument. Which I don’t think Davidson and Rees-Mogg make, by the way.
I never said that Davidson and Rees-Moog advance the praxeological justification. I said the best attempts to justify that kind of thinking do. In fact, that the Sovereign Individual is silent on its normative foundations, and simply tracks a technological determinist argument — that to your point, the incentives leading intractably towards a certain outcome — is the entire basis for my charge of epistemic authoritarianism.
An example of what I’m saying would be the notion that say “the welfare state won’t be possible, even if people want it” in the future that is laid out. That’s an implicit normative constraint that takes arguments about a common good that isn’t merely a feature of revealed market preferences, betrays a very extreme right-libertarian view at the bottom of the whole thesis.
So I apologize if I wasn’t clear enough in the following paragraph to separate the critique of the argument from the praxeological argument for the normative foundations of such a view. But I’d argue, if anything, I am trying to bring my critique against the strongest form of the argument. Which I don’t think Davidson and Rees-Mogg make, by the way.
Technological determinism is a real mind virus that afflicts way too many people in my field. It’s pervasive and has led an incredibly large group of people to make dramatic philosophical errors. The book, the Sovereign Individual, has played at outsized role among many people — especially in the “web3” space — at convincing people of the inevitability of future outcomes. Balaji’s “network states” are really just another revision on these philosophical errors, born of foundationalist a priori notions about moral truths.
The best attempts at defending these moral truths — such as things like praxeology — are completely unconvincing and are just tautologies that assume the things they set out to prove. In particular, property rights as intractable consequences of the moral necessity to enable human action by a fundamental — not social — right to the product of one’s own labor.
These arguments all also boil down to “this future is going to happen whether you like it or not”, which really betrays the epistemically authoritarian nature of this thinking, which denies the possibility for, and the normative possibility of collection action in defense of a common good.
I also have an argument based on thermodynamics as to why I think these arguments are true at a systems level — but I know people roll their eyes on this stuff as it is.
I will also say, this same argument, when generalized brings into question the whole concept of digital contracts as workable at all. The idea of self-executing contracts that can be used to revolutionize everything from property titles to equities trading. But any sane workable system is going to rely on truth oracles that have some social component to deal with disputes. And if that’s true, then we’re probably right back in good old regular law courts.
At which point, the question just immediately needs to be asked: why do we have these digital contracts in the first place?
I actually think this is a completely fatal blow to the entire idea of Web3. The intractable problem is staring you in the face, if you do some philosophical exploration of the people. nostr:note1np9663690xy42xlh6ec9pa9mjxxttsa5ue6retld7ckc58lnfzgqw93ejf
I’m somewhat skeptical that there’s some technological solution around the corner, where the scaling issues around bitcoin are going to be solved to such a degree, that all payments themselves can be trustless.
The main reason being that all of the solutions being pursued thus far, achieve trustlessness by giving up on the possibility of recourse in the transaction. The only real counterparty probelem being solved then, is eliminating the possibility of settlement default, once a transaction has been arranged. But this has never been the only trust issue in payment arrangements.
Most of the kinds of default that people think about in the real world, have nothing to do with the possibility of non-settlement, and everything to do with the possibility of breach of contract on the delivery of goods or rendering of services. To the extent that bitcoin scaling discussions set these issues aside, and instead center the discussion around durability in only the most adversarial situations (resisting state overreach, usually) — a broader understanding of the way economic advancement comes about is ignored.
Economies don’t flourish simply because they have reliable money and payment schemes. They flourish because social trust is possible — that people will honor contracts, commitments, won’t resort to violent means of dispute resolution.
This is actually why I find the anarcho-capitalist frame of thinking around bitcoin so distracting to moving bitcoin forward. The target it’s aiming for, simply bypasses all of these notions, and is really just an exercise in question begging.
“But if we have recourse on payments, how will that prevent the government being able to regulate or censor it?”
If that’s what you think is the highest good to be considered in the project of finding ways to scale bitcoin payments, then I’d suggest that none of the solutions you land on are going to be satisfactory for mainstream use — ever. Because there can never be a way to control for matters of social trust through cryptographic protocols alone. We are not digital light beings that live inside computers, that can be forced to act or not act based on computational rules. Our interaction with any technology is always analog and mediated by a social context — where all the interesting problems of counterparty risk exist.
This is, of course, what the insight was that led to the creation of tbDEX. Instead of any doubts being raised in me about this observation, the stridency of my stance here has only increased, as I’ve watched the conversation move forward.
Elections are a legitimizing function for political power. That is the role they play. Approaching electoral choices like a purity test and one of cosmic significance to your character, is downstream of some very impoverished understandings of both democracy and society itself.
Ultimately, we have to confront the pragmatic reality that we are ultimately navigating a hierarchy of good. If you resist this notion, you’re actually participating in a fairly dangerous game of reducing the umbrella of interests the political economy will be responsive to, to the most craven — if for no other reason than smaller polities are easier to capture.
For me, character is just as important as policy in thinking about these things, because the question I ask myself about who I want having power, is not one merely about “what policies does this person support?” — but a more subtle one: “who would I feel more comfortable disagreeing with, knowing the conversation can continue, and that our current policy commitments remain, in perpetuity, provisional?”