that isn't true.
they didn't get 51% and Bitcoin is just as susceptible to this kind of attack as Monero is.
if someone makes a shitcoin and uses it to pay miners extra rewards to mine to their pool and then their pool does reorgs on the chain,
this is something ANYBODY can do at any time on any chain. it isn't unique to monero.
You're also not responding to the point that I made.
They mined blocks on the side then released the new branch forcing a block reorganization.
This is how double spending attacks are executed.
ok.
any large pool on any PoW chain could do this.
That’s why you need 6 blocks to consider a transaction as valid.
If they can keep the attack for long periods of time, they render your settlements useless.
You need those confirmations because PoW is probabilistic. Any entity with a large share of hashrate, even if it's less than 51%, can selfish mine and force block reorgs on any PoW coin. Their successful attempts increase the more hashrate they have, but it doesn't require anywhere even close to 51% to start disrupting the network.
Agree, the problem is for how long can the attacker sustain a “longer” branch.
1 hour of desync is accounted in the design, a full week is no bueno.
Then at 51% their branch will accumulate more PoW over long periods of time.
Exactly Qubic couldn't sustain it. Even during the attack you just had to wait for more confirmations.
My point was that for example Foundry alone could selfish mine Bitcoin already and it would be the same situation as Qubic and Monero. They have about as much hashrate as Qubic had at it's peak as with Monero. Just because they haven't done it yet doesn't mean they don't have the ability to. Incentives make it unlikely, but selfish mining inverts incentives. It's more of an economic attack.
several companies accepting Monero insisted on 15 confs during the attack.
it depends on the specifics of the attack I'm sure, but it seems like 6 conf on Bitcoin is excessive.
in the case of this specific attack, the transactions that were reorged out reverted to the mempool and settled later.
but the attacker *could try to double spend by spending, reorging and then broadcasting a conflicting transaction in hopes that it gets mined before the first.
monero doesn't have RBF.
but timing a transaction in hopes that your pool is going to get lucky with a reorg,
and then get lucky again with a rebroadcast transaction seems like a pretty poor bet.
and exactly what is this transaction for and how is the double spend not detected immediately...?
does not seem particularly useful. I think these kinds of attacks are mostly useful simply if you want to destroy confidence in the chain.
so in this particular case, I would say the attack was a failure.
6 conf on bitcoin is overkill
several companies accepting Monero insisted on 15 confs during the attack 😯
it depends on the specifics of the attack I'm sure, but it seems like 6 conf on Bitcoin is excessive.
in the case of this specific attack, the transactions that were reorged out reverted to the mempool and settled later.
but the attacker *could try to double spend by spending a tx, reorging and then broadcasting a conflicting transaction in hopes that it gets mined before the first.
monero doesn't have RBF.
but timing a transaction in hopes that your pool is going to get lucky with a reorg,
and then get lucky again with a rebroadcast transaction seems like a pretty poor bet.
and exactly what is this transaction for and how is the double spend not detected immediately...? does not seem particularly useful.
I think these kinds of attacks are mostly useful simply if you want to destroy confidence in the chain.
so in this particular case, I would say the attack was a failure.
This attack was a demonstration performed by a “good actor”, they didn’t intend to double spend.
You are right, these attacks resemble a DDOS , they are less dramatic than expected but they still destroy confidence in the resilience of the network.
If Monero ever becomes an important monetary system these attacks will be real and more common.
it was just a publicity stunt.
they didn't manage to destroy confidence.
it's just something that people interested in POW vulnerability should know about.
there's nothing about Monero that makes it more (or less) susceptible to this.
well
obviously it's easier to do on smaller POW networks
