I'm sure some monero bro will jump in with justifications but nostr:npub1yxp7j36cfqws7yj0hkfu2mx25308u4zua6ud22zglxp98ayhh96s8c399s has repeatedly shown that more information is publicly available about a monero transaction than a lightning one.
there are certainly advantages to transacting on a L2.
there are disadvantages as well.
as STN will no doubt point out, NOT recording data forever on a blockchain has its perks.
and nobody denies it.
that doesnt make Lightning "security" (whatever the fuck that means) inherently better.
in fact, end users generally cannot even measure how secure any given Lightning tx is. it is unknown and users trust information isn't being recorded and shared.
what do you mean when you use the term "secure" here?
oh sure
let Bill run his mouth about superior security but hold my feet to the fire 😂
here I mean that information about the transaction isnt leaking to 3rd parties.
I wanted to make sure you guys were talking about the same thing. I knew what Bill meant (I think. nostr:npub1qyxlpj2gl6dt2nfvkl4yyrl6pr2hjkycrdh2dr5r42n7ktwn7pdqrdmu7u should confirm)
Privacy is probably the better term here.
> users trust information isn't being recorded and shared
Even if routing nodes collude they cannot identify the sender or the recipient
nostr:npub1lxzaxzge0jq9u9cecucctdt5lslwgp7hcxmp2l0wn8r2ecjenwasu6svxa, do you have evidence that this isn't true ?
if your threat model is a global passive adversary they clearly know where payments begin and end.
his (unexpressed) point is "the second and second-to-last nodes on a route can't be sure they are second and 2nd to last"
but it totally depends on the level of collusion between large nodes. a global passive adversary isn't required, if enough large nodes (particularly in a hub-and-spoke design) collude they can have *reasonable certainty* where payments originate and end up.
Add mapping via channel probing and consider.
not saying it happening now,
but I AM saying,if it was happening you wouldn't know.
which is why we have L1 systems designed to function in the open.
That is the advantage of using a blockchain and not an L2.
everything is tradeoffs.
> if your threat model is a global passive adversary they clearly know where payments begin and end
they don't know which of your messages are real and which are decoys
they also don't know the contents of your messages
> they can have *reasonable certainty* where payments originate and end up
they can "say" they have reasonable certainty about that, but in many jurisdictions they would have to prove it in court, and that's often a pretty tough standard
how do you know the person who *looks* like the sender (or the recipient) isn't just another routing node? Even mobile phones can route payments and are incentivized to do so, so you just don't know
yeah fair enough.
so what?
I'm concerned about users being able to make accurate threat assessment.
not being able to establish plausible deniability in court if their threat assessment is wrong.
"they could collude but you can just argue the payment came from somewhere else" isn't compelling.
If every routing node colludes the best they can do is point to a node and say "that one was the next hop back and did not collude with us"
It might be your node, it might not be -- either way, they have no proof of wrongdoing
and thats usually good enough for normies.
but plausible deniability in the event they miscalculate or dont have all the information is not enough for most people with strong threat models.
