the final boss is not domain names but IP address ranges.

it would be simple to create a distributed registry that associates a relay npub with an IP address, but if IANA for whatever reeson is leaned on to yank the privilege to some IP address range, what's important to understand is that this is INBOUND connection is snuffed out. OUTBOUND is still ok, so long as there are relay/middlemen to act as rendezvous points.

honestly, i doubt that they can really police IP numbers as a means to stop a network from functioning. they'd sooner do it to shut down Tor, for a start, but they won't because every government spook agency depends on having that tool as a means to cover their activity, among many other tools, it is still one they can and surely have used.

forget about DNS, all you need to do is have a distributed registry of relay/server IP addresses with the pubkey, and the issuer, from this address, signs it. replicas can then be queried for a pubkey, and then you find the addresses associated with the key, and connect this way.

tor hidden services already function by use of a PKI, just the same.

names is a separate layer, this requires something like a blockchain. probably it would be a perfectly fine use of the small space needed, like an OP_RETURN gives you 80 bytes, that's a pubkey, a name up to 48 characters long, and can be signed by the pubkey itself. then there needs to be some kind of first-come-first-served scheme of property claims of names, and those directories i spoke of with the IP/key bindings, can use a common algorithm to read off the claims on chain and only allow the first claim, and then using a key transfer protocol (i assign this name to new claimant) which would also fit in an OP_RETURN.

i don't think that it really needs to be monetised, if you design the protocol to be robust, people can build their own implementations of a marketplace in names at this point, but if the name hasn't been claimed, you only need to pay a bitcoin transaction fee.