We must be living in parallel universes.
From what I can see, Core always argues calmly, professionally, with logic and technical arguments
while Knots always argues with emotional fallacies, false analogies, and plenty of ad-hominem and conspiracy theories.
That being said, Calle is an arrogant fuck and doesn't care about how he choses his words in this debate at all. Wouldn't assume that his opinion/behaviour represents "the Core side".
They calmly and professionally call anyone who disagrees with them an idiot.
There was an scaling solution that needs slightly bigger OP_RETURN so they decided to bloat utxo set instead. When core saw that they decided to increase memeppol limit. What was the scaling project?
I forgot and can't find it under all op_return rage. :D
It was Citrea, and AFAIK they plan to use utxo stuffing only if a bitvm contract is challenged. This is designed never to occur, as it requires someone to manually create and submit a "cheating" bitvm transaction, whereas "honest" bitvm software is designed to try very hard not to let you do that.
Besides the disincentive of manual work, it also carries a huge monetary disincentive: your counterparty in the bitvm contract is meant to be running software that automatically detects cheat txs and responds by taking all of the money the cheater put in the bitvm contract. (It works a lot like a lightning penalty tx, but more complicated because bitvm is complicated.)
Despite being designed never to occur, this potential for extremely rare utxo stuffing by one party has been leveraged to relax the op_return limit for everyone. Which I think is silly.
After this explanation core arguments look much weaker.
You are stuck in the past (few weeks :D).
Core people got annoyed by sub-par core arguments and either stopped responding or responded with snarky comments.
This provoked a new breed of knots arguers with more coherent arguments.
So what are the professional, logical, and technical arguments for easier CSAM inclusion into the blockchain (and we know it *will* happen)? This enables a new .gov attack surface. We can only go from zero to one once. Why assume this risk?
