Jordan Peterson claims that it doesn't matter how good you are at playing the game if nobody wants to play with you.

Side note, I do like game theory based conflict resolution:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divide_and_choose

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If they want to play, they will learn to play in a way that people will want to play with them. It doesn't need to be forced, because they will want that social interaction, and they will, if they are anything like me, value the other person's happiness too.

Divide and choose, very interesting. This sounds like a specific application of Coasian side bargaining, or of the homesteading principle wherein equal claims are granted, or the original acquisition is in dispute, or the acquisition is contractually agreed in advance to be determined by this method. Game theory offers truly wonderful insights into specific problems in matters of libertarian property rights and utilitarian questions, with immense wealth even in what little bit I am aware of.

We may be talking past each other. It sounds very much like you are considering the central and cohesive planning, bonding, culture, and strategizing of smaller familial units, while I am speaking to the necessary freedom and independent thought upon which the ability to plan at all lies, even at the family level. Subtle distinctions must be made clear for that all to work. Otherwise, all you get is entitlement, weakness, dysfunction, pettiness, destruction.

The problem is we are always dealing with shared resources despite property rights. Kids too loud? Exert some sort of force to keep them quite. Everything they 'own' was given to them, etc. It's a tragedy of the commons issue where socialism emerges as tit for tat that allows for mistakes play out. I think capitalism turns into crowny capitalism when dealing with shared resources unless some sort of conflict resolution protocol is used. But you are 100% right that if you get out of the way, tit for tat will emerge in a capitalistic environment.

Tragedy of the commons happens when property rights are not clear. So one must make them clear to the children. You don't force them to share, you force them to conform to not hurting others or messing up their property, if needed. All else is education and freedom. You as a parent probably own the house. So you are kind of like a monarch, except you don't tax the child. You govern the rules of the house, but you let the kid learn how to truly respect himself and his fellows.

I kinda do force them to share candy. Because otherwise theirs teeth would rot 😂

I agree that 99.99999% of problems are effortlessly solved with property rights IF they are clearly defined. The edge cases are absurd and never play out when property rights are enforced in real life.

So the monarchy vs tit for that that allows for mistakes that emerge into a socialist structure tradeoff is measured by this: (I love that term 'cost of anarchy' BTW)

The "cost of anarchy" in mechanism design refers to the inefficiency that arises in a system when individuals act in their own self-interest rather than cooperating for a collective good. It is often quantified in terms of the difference between the social welfare achieved under a centralized, optimal mechanism and the social welfare achieved under a decentralized mechanism where agents act independently.

In more formal terms, the cost of anarchy is typically defined as the ratio of the worst-case social welfare (or utility) achieved by a Nash equilibrium of a game to the optimal social welfare that could be achieved with a centrally designed mechanism. This concept is particularly relevant in the context of game theory and economics, where it highlights the potential inefficiencies that can arise in competitive environments.

Mathematically, if \( SW^* \) is the optimal social welfare and \( SW_{NE} \) is the social welfare at a Nash equilibrium, the cost of anarchy (CoA) can be expressed as:

\[

\text{Cost of Anarchy} = \frac{SW_{NE}}{SW^*}

\]

A CoA greater than 1 indicates that the decentralized outcome is less efficient than the optimal outcome, emphasizing the potential losses due to individualistic behavior in the absence of coordination or regulation. Understanding the cost of anarchy helps in designing mechanisms that can mitigate these inefficiencies, such as through incentives or regulations that align individual interests with social welfare.