that makes no sense. unlike every other aspect of mining, collusion should be the default position w BIP300.

if i ran a decent size pool i’d vote for a WT^ transaction that just pays out all pools in proportion to hashrate everytime (for simple steal attempt 1). no offchain coordination required

i guarantee the miner rev FCF from drivechains is never gonna be close to the 2WP custody, never mind the fact it’s a technically seperate thing. and there’s no rational incentive to be honest outside of that.

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That's a great point about how obvioue collusion would be. Again, I think miners stealing is good.

I don't agree at all with your second point though. Why would the balance in the 2wp ever be very high? You could instantly swap in, do your zero knowledge coin mixing or prediction market bet, then instantly swap out. Plus, if you think that a drivechain can capture even 10% of the market for monero or zcash transacrion fees (not to mention ethereum) then mm revenue could be pretty nicr for miners.

come-on man that’s the whole point of the BIP. someone’s gotta hold the bag in the end and it’s gonna be the bitcoiner version of LUNA/UST

I disagree, I think it would work.

Only people that opt-in "hold the bag" during a miner theft. Everyone else is fine.

I guess in that sense, it is like LUNA/UST: mainchain bitcoin unaffected.

that’s not how it works. opt-in is cope

drivechains