Perhaps there's a place for it on that front.
Though, arguably, the need to find a buyer in spot would lead people to producing things only that have a higher likelihood of payout, less malinvestment and less risk taking.
Which, from a Keynesian stance sounds bad, but do we really want to incentivize production of things there isn't demand for?
I'm not here to stop anyone from doing anything, mind you. I just generally see more hazard here than benefit. If you have rotting fruit sometimes, you either produce less, people pay more to cover your costs, or somewhere in between. If they don't, it's not that there's not enough fruit -- it's that the market doesn't demand it.
That said, sure, people will likely always trade for promises. That seems to be a tale as old as ledger money itself. It's just worth always remembering that a promise is only as good as the promiser. Probably for the best to have tools to implement and store them in a neutral, public, and cryptographically verifiable format though, if only to provide that inescapable reputation to hold people to their oaths.
Perhaps the issue isn't promises. It's promises lightly made.
The sellers are giving away their production, hard work.
Companies in the global supply chain do not grant the necessary 30, 60 or 90 days lightly.
They check on the buyer company, they have long term relationships.
The bill of exchange then gives them the liquidity to continue operating, without shutting down, creating unemployment.
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