It’s not without trade offs, but it’s not objectively worse than single sig for individuals. For some ppl single sig is a better option. I hope those people are strapped tho. Don’t want to fall prey to a $5 wrench attack

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Sorry bud but you are objectively wrong. I hope those reading can understand and learn from your misconception

Sure pal

Have fun rugging yourself by introducing unnecessary complexity to your cold storage solution.

It's harder to secure multiple keys than it is to secure one key. That is a fact. Stop misleading people with your lack of understanding.

Be Dre

Get $5 wrench attack on your multisig.

Lose access to one of your keys

Attacker cannot get your coins

But now neither can Dre

Don't be like Dre

Lmao no one does m of m multisigs. But sure I should go to single sig, that will really protect against an attacker 😂 you crack me up. Top notch trolling or maybe you’re serious idk bless your heart either way

If you have a two of three multisig wallet you need two of three private keys and three of three public keys to move the fund If you do not have backups of your public keys then your funds are gone. Multi-Sig is not inherently more secure. You are just leaving more room for error yourself. There is no reason to use multi-sig if it is just funds for your individual use.

Bro what 🤨 it sounds like you’re assuming incompetency or imminent failure from individuals

If you lose just one key, you will lose access to your coins. This is not for individuals cold storage. I don't assume incompetency, I assume people make mistakes or forget things. Recommending multisig for individuals cold storage solutions shows your lack of understanding what multisig use case is actually for. If you would just listen to Anton in the video I linked maybe you will find some clarity.

There are multisig setups for individuals with no single points of failure

Except for losing one of the keys... Seems like a single point to me.

Wow. I guess I have to spell it out for you. By no single point of failure setup I left the door open to imply a multisig setup with redundant and robust backups for EACH key. Where failure of 1 backup would be time and space isolated.

If you are making backups of multiple keys, why have multiple? The only reason to have multiple is if you need more than one party to have access to funds. If you are an individual. 1 person. It is much more secure to have one key. It's the whole entire ethos behind the master password (bip-44). If you are an individual, multisig is introducing complexity to access funds for no reason. It is inherently easier to secure one key than it is to secure multiple. That's not really debatable.

Valid points. What about a security breach of your single key?

My single key that doesn't even exist on an electronic device and has never been on one that's touched the internet. The single key that can only be constructed with the seed words etched in titanium and kept in my personal safe. That would be one hell of a security breach.

Also valid. I appreciate the reminder to consider probabilities while assigning or forgoing redundancies.

It's not that I think multisig isn't a great technology or something that fortifies Bitcoin. But the truth is the vast majority of coins are lost to self rugging. That is a fact. I just want people to understand when it's necessary. Antonopolis explains it very well in the video I linked as well. Most people simply do not need it and have a misconception that it's inherently more secure when it's really not.

If someone points a gun to your family are you not going to open the safe?

A multi sig such as a 2 of 4 or 3 of 5 poses a greater challenge for an attacker to overcome as he now has to drive you to a second or third location to get the other keys, and it gives the user margin of error as he can afford to lose access to 2 keys and still be able to recover the funds. With a single key, while it works just fine in a lot of cases one most likely will either keep the seed and/or signing device at home where it is easy for an attacker to coerce you into giving up your key, or at a safety deposit box or similar location where a third party might be coerced by the state to give them access to your stuff (seed).

Granted not everyone is at risk of a physical attack depending on where you live and your lifestyle.

But when you have a large portion of your net worth in bitcoin I would think twice before having a single point of failure. That is why I said I hope everyone doing that carries a gun and is able to fight back against a physical attacker.

It was true in the past that a multisig was not user friendly for beginners, and many ppl lost coins because they fucked up something. That problem has been solved with collaborative multisig products like those offered by Casa, Unchained, Nunchuk, and others.

If you’re not already doing this I recommend you SEED XOR your key and implement a login countdown of at least 24hrs on your signing device if it happens to be a coldcard.

Sir ... I live in the United States. If someone points a gun at me or my family, I shoot them.

Seems like you have it all figured out. Carry on sir.

For everyone else that is not a trained killer, they might benefit from the points I made.

https://github.com/jlopp/physical-bitcoin-attacks/blob/master/README.md

Multiple single sig > a single multisig...

Secondly I won't waste my time with how ridiculous your scenario is. Multi sig won't help.

You can't lose any of the keys. If you have a 2 of 3 multisig, you need 2 private keys and 3 public keys to sign the transaction. If you don't have backups of the seed phrase for all 3 keys, your funds are gone forever. You're literally arguing about shit you don't even know how it works. I'm so done with the convos man. Anyone else reading, dyor. Don't believe Dre, because if you just think you know what you're talking about and are so arrogant you can't be bothered to humble yourself and listen to what someone else has to say, you can lose access to all your wealth as a result of your own hubris.

You're much better off with a decoy wallet than a multisig solution. But you admire complexity. There's a famous quote about that in computer science.

If you don't want one single point of failure, you need multiple wallets, not multiple signatures. One multisig wallet is still a one point of failure.