plaintext attacks can only be possible if the message nonces are weak

reuse of a nonce is absolutely out, as it enables a plaintext attack

giftwraps already provide forward secrecy if the relay does not provide access to the events without auth proving the client is involved in the message exchange

what we are missing at this point is good support of nip-65 mailbox support and delete event support

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I'm speaking strictly to ciphertext attacks, where the content is highly predictable, nonce is known because it's public, and 1/2 of the shared key is available, although I doubt that's useful but still worth considering.

all of those things depend on repeating nonces, or as you mention, repeating pubkeys

these are very easy to avoid, but maybe there is some programming languages that still make it complicated to access a strong CSPRNG

more than a few instances in the history of bitcoin where dodgy entropy led to wallets being cracked and UTXOs stolen

very often, propagandistic, opportunistic, manipulative "study" articles

to avoid being in such a story make sure you understand the mechanisms well enough to know where it has weaknesses

strong entropy, private random number generation is really central to all of the security of these things, just make sure you know the quality of entropy you are using before you inflict this shit on users haha