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crap

It’s better to remove it. That’s so creepy.

I hear his point, but it’s again a point where the software dev in Matt has blinded him for the reality of Bitcoin.

Removing it would just force regulated entities to remain on old versions.

We need to replace it with something better.

It’s far from that simple. Most sensible jurisdictions have no such requirement, and having software broadly available encourages them to add such a thing. AFAIK the only jurisdiction with any such requirement is Switzerland, and it’s also not clear at all what would or would not meet the requirements. The requirements aren’t defined technically they’re defined broadly, simply signing that it’s your address and the exchange checking Chainanalysis might well suffice.

It‘s that simple. A feature is in Bitcoin and is being used. There is no taking it out again. All you could do is split the versions of code used and long run risk another network split.

Nah lol, almost no one uses it today.

That’s not true. Most European countries either do or have such extensive regulations to force you to Switzerland who do.

On top of that several tools that have nothing to do with KYC use signed messages, Amboss, nostr.directory…

You cannot make incompatible code to take a feature out unless you want to split the chain.

The only way to get rid of it os by creating something better. Teleporting Bitcoin for example will make KYC by signing irrelevant.

This has no risk of “chain split”?! This is wholly unrelated. And any EU countries with such a requirement are gonna have no such requirement with (the current draft text of) MiCA.

The recent European regulations do not have aopp like requirements, but it seems inevitable from the tone of this legislation they will. Individual countries may also decide to interpret it in a way similar to the Swiss if you withdraw to self custody. We should not make it easy to "over comply" by signing to prove control of our self custodial addresses.

If they want to make that a requirement they can implement it and users should have an appropriate amount of fear/resistance for using such systems.

The whole point is that you cannot take features out, not that this use is great.

Sure you can, especially when no one uses them so they won’t be missed today!

It seems like quite a jump to say that the current regs that they’ve spent a ton of time building don’t have such a requirement but but they’re definitely gonna add it? Do you know something the rest of us don’t?

More generally, the push should be that there’s no way to practically verify, and exchanges instead should get users to agree and then do risk based analysis, not push users into a nuts protocol.

I'm just being pessimistic, no inside info. Governments are trending towards wanting more and more of people's (previously) confidential transaction information. The EUR 1000 cash purchase limit is an example of this insanity.

It's something we should push back against and so I support your proposal.🙂

I’d much rather we fight those regs than give in. Travel rule is a thing but the compliance needs to focus on the exchange -> exchange transactions, where the rule applies, rather than forcing the exchange -> user transactions to add more complexity.

The point remains that we need to add innovation to obsolete the feature or better break the surveillance use case.

If you take it out you fragment the versions in the network and long term likely force a chain split.

And travel rule and Mica require verification that goes much beyond just signing a message, so if you want to take it out to snub regulators, you are only snubbing the more privacy focused ones like the Swiss, not the evil jurisdictions.

🤢🤮