Okay, I have studied this topic some more.

Apparently with bitVM, we are talking about a federated model that depends on collateral. So if the amount of BTC in a sidechain is more than the collateral, we need the investor to add more collateral or we risk the funds. The 6-month timelock is not like BIP300, where there is a constant warning the miners are attempting to steal.

Any L2 that doesn’t pay the miners will eventually be controlled by the miners. The whole "miner centralization" is far more likely in this scenario than whatever Shinobi was talking about with the $10M Amazon node.

Miners will become the LSPs. If they cannot easily capture the LSPs, then it would be in their interest to censor justice transactions until everyone switches to their LSP. Same with federated sidechains. After many soft forks, this might solve scalability, but what about privacy?

The likelihood of any of this happening is very small. But BIP300, like Bitcoin, provides miners with a goose that lays golden eggs, and this is one of the oldest and most trusted incentive models in the world. And like lightning, it relies on the hope that miners want Bitcoin to succeed, because nobody has more skin in the game than them.